Institutionalized Hegemony: Saudi Identity through the Legal Discourse of Citizenship

Institutionalized Hegemony: 

Saudi Identity through the 

Legal Discourse of Citizenship

Mohammad Fuad AlJishi

According to the 2006 statistical study about the workforce in Saudi Arabia, which was conducted by the Central Department of Statistics, only 49% out of more than 8 million workers were Saudi citizens[1]. In Saudi Arabia, foreign workforce participates in all fields of industry and significantly contributes to the stability of the daily lives of millions of Saudis both socially and economically. In 2005, Saudi Arabia reopened its doors into accepting naturalization applications of foreigners. Under the pressures of globalization, Saudi Arabia had to appropriately absorb its massive population of non-nationals. Long-forgotten generations of immigrant workers have been residing in the kingdom, yet they have always maintained their own sphere, becoming socially segregated from the locals. In reality, the country was stratified into two identities: one of the nationals and one of the non-nationals.

Generally, law plays an instrumental role in creating identities and categorizing individuals as it constructs privileges to some, and advantages to others.  Bearing that in mind, this paper outlines the manner through which the Saudi government discursively constructed a hegemonic image that was articulated through the legal affairs of its citizens and resident-aliens. The paper reveals that the Saudi government’s successful methodology of inspiring a national common identity hinges upon a narrative in which economy, society and politics are all connected and conceptualized in imagined synchronism[2]. Specifically, I argue that the Saudi legal discourse of citizenship, infused into other laws that regulate the status of foreigners, such as naturalization, residency permits, and sponsorship programs, forged a common identity among its subjects; an identity that is not only deliberately outlined so as to exclude non-nationals, but also one that promotes the supremacy of Saudis. Further, in order to play a more active role in the current global economy, Saudi Arabia would have to adjust that identity; and one way to achieve such a change is through reviving its naturalization policy.

To begin with, the history of naturalization in Saudi Arabia goes back to the founding of the country in 1932. At that early phase, the inhabitants of the Middle East were still unfamiliar with the emerging borders that divided their vast land into separate states. Indeed, former CEO of Aramco Oil Company affirms that “when he first arrived in the kingdom in late 1937, virtually no persons considered themselves Saudis”[3]. With such impressions in mind, an influx of Arabs from neighboring territories arrived to the newly established kingdom. Many of them immigrated not only to escape the harsh conditions of colonial rule in their respective regions, but also to contribute to the building of the government and economy of the Saudi state. For the founders, not only such immigration was unobjectionable but it was necessary to the development of the state. Because Saudi Arabia experienced little Ottoman domination and no Western colonization, the country was not familiar with any modern system of administration[4]. Thus, the king made comprehensive efforts to indiscriminately recruit and naturalize any immigrant community. Madawi Al-Rasheed asserts that the king naturalized African, Indian, European and Persian communities[5]. Abdul-Rahman Al-Rashid remarks that “King Abdulaziz appointed non-Saudis as ambassadors, ministers and advisors” where “they offered great services to the young state at that early and crucial stage”[6]. However, with the advent of political contentions between Arab countries in the 1960’s, naturalization became rare[7]. Such halt of naturalization, took place on the advent of a Saudi economic boom, which, as Al-Rasheed remarks, ultimately consolidated the “distinctions between ‘insiders and outsiders’”.

During the politically volatile period of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the kingdom experienced several dissident movements, which, in many cases, were initiated by non-native Saudis[8]. As a result, the government was “eager to distribute lavish benefits to those who are defined as nationals” in an effort to avert the public from politics and gain the people’s loyalty[9]. Moreover, to support such a lavish lifestyle as well as a rapidly thriving economy, the government had to import millions of cheap foreign workers, particularly from South and Southeast Asia. Such sudden presence of a substantial foreign workforce in all levels of society threatened the so-called “Saudi cultural integrity,” and made the Saudis feel as though they were a minority[10]. In this context, the government was forced to take strong measures to restrain foreigners and differentiate them from nationals. For example, “only Saudi citizens had a right to higher education, property ownership, and permanent residence”[11]. Not being able to accommodate millions of non-Saudi children in public schools, the Saudi government introduced quotas that restrict the number of non-Saudis in public schools to 3-5% of the total school population[12]. As a result, 90% of expatriates were forced “to choose the more expensive option of sending their children to private schools”12. What’s more, in the early 1980’s, and in the process of separating the Passport Department from the Civil Status Department[13], the government reinforced its Internal Passport system, known as Iqama, which is a residential permit, by introducing a “sponsorship program,” which entitled a Saudi “sponsor” to dominate a “sponsored” foreign worker[14]. By 1992, and after the Gulf War crisis, the king Fahd issued a royal decree that delineated the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia.

In reference to such history, just as it originated in late 18^th century France[15], citizenship and residency regulations in the kingdom were introduced to minimize disruptions not only by aliens but also by internal divisions. For example, the sponsorship system was an effective vehicle through which people practiced their longing for power instead of being occupied by familial, tribal, or even political rivalries.

In fear of local diversity and in an effort to homogenize its subjects, the Saudi state attempted to define or rather construct ethnic commonalities by emphasizing religion, language, and genealogy. Specifically, the high selectivity of the kingdom’s “jus sanguinis conception of citizenship”36contributed to the gradual construction of a hegemonic paradigm of ethno-nationalism that, as Anh Longva states, revolves around an “imagined” [16], “natural and ethnically pure community”[17].

To begin with, although Arab speaking nations extend from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, certain nations tended to emphasize their Arab ancestry more than others; most distinguished of these is Saudi Arabia. As David Long corroborates “virtually all Saudis belong to an extended family”[18]. In fact, most identify with a specific tribe and “value blood-ties even more than money”18. In this regard, Saudis identify themselves in a collective manner rather on individual basis18. Thus, because indigenous Saudis appreciated kinship much more than statehood,[19] the Saudi state had to present itself in a manner that attaches statehood to every subject[20]. To accomplish this, the founding Al-Saud clan portrayed their kingdom as if it was a huge tribe inclusive of all Saudi citizens, “with the monarchy fulfilling the patriarchal obligations of the tribal sheik [i.e. leader]”20. Therefore, just as Saudi citizenship naturally emerged from such patrilineally “shared descent,”[21] so did the stringency of the naturalization process; the king had to preserve the honor of the kingdom just as the sheik used to guard the admission to his tribe20. Such a tribal paradigm evolved gradually culminating with the issuing of the Basic law in 1992.  Hence, it is no wonder that Articles 9 and 10, respectively, of Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law of Governance specifically declare that “the family is the nucleus of Saudi society,”[22] and that “the state shall aspire to promote family bonds”22.

Taking that in consideration, and as tribalism entails the necessity of keeping “the blood-lines pure”20, marriages between Saudis and non-nationals seemed inconceivable to the state, and thus invalid. Because marrying non-Saudi nationals was no longer tolerable, and naturalization was not an option, the only way that foreigners could legally live with their Saudi spouses was by applying for  a home-working visa, in which they were assigned a legal status of a ‘housekeeper’[23]. “Furthermore, custody disputes favor the Saudi parent and often rules in favor of men [emphasizing the state’s patriarchal values], putting non-Saudi women at greater risk of losing custody and being forced to leave the country after divorce. Visitation rights under these circumstances are virtually non-existent unless the Saudi parent with custody voluntarily puts in the effort to make the arrangements”23.

Secondly, because Islam is genuinely mutual to all Saudi society, it became fundamental to the discursive construction of Saudi law and identity. For example, article 14 of the Naturalization statute requires an authorized certification from a government-appointed local-mosque Imam in which it declares the applicant to be a proper Muslim[24]. This rather explicit form of “Islamic” supervision confirms Michelle Foucault’s concept of domination through surveillance. In confirmation, Eleanor Doumato remarks that Islam was also infused extensively throughout the public-education curriculum, whose development “has been systematically enlisted in Saudi Arabia’s nation-building project at least since 1970,”[25] a period that was preceded by a sudden increase in the dependence on foreign labor. Clearly, in both legal practice and principle, and through government-appointed hegemonic institutions, Saudi nationals were subconsciously instructed to belief in the superiority of the government’s interpretation of Islam. In this view, non-nationals are seen as deficient Muslims, since they lack the government’s approval as they neither have significant access to public education, nor do they have the privilege to be naturalized[26].

Furthermore, as it adopted a traditional tribal structure, the kingdom had to implement a welfare system to comfort its citizens. Just as the tribal patriarch was expected to sustain the wellbeing of his tribal members by distributing available resources among them, so did the newly established kingdom. Although implementing a tribe-like structure secured the organizational composition of the kingdom, it, at the same time, re-inscribed “in society the values of patriarchal privilege”[27]. Because patriarchal economy wasn’t designed for a capitalist, efficiency-based market, such traditional Bedouin values proved to be futile. While tribal welfare was based on subsistence-level solidarity-based economy, Saudi standards of living became based on ownership of private property. Indeed, Saudi lifestyle, grew to be highly dependent on the state’s facilities rather than on personal qualities or achievements. Laurent Murawiec remarks that Saudis made no “effort to produce” because they believed that industrial work was reserved for inferiors, especially that “it requires conformity to rules and obedience to superiors who are not tribal [chiefs]”[28] Because the endurance of Saudis’ daily-life amenities was reliant on oil-income, oil became a fundamental part of Saudi identity. Additionally, the kingdom’s status as a welfare state demanded an institutionalization of public resources in such a way that citizenship became more than a legal identification or a means of communicating with the state. In fact, citizenship in Saudi Arabia had no political dimension to it, as the state was arranged based on an absolute monarchy. 

In this regard, and as the state manipulates the distribution of the oil wealth among its subjects, citizenship developed into a tool for social stratification rather than a framework of entitlements and responsibilities; an “exclusionary force”[29] that consolidates a group while repudiating another. Indeed, more than just to ease the regulations of foreigners, the sponsorship program, which diffused disciplinary power throughout Saudi society, played an important social function. Contrary to expectations, sponsorship, known as Kafalah, constituted more than just “a labor-contract through which an agreed amount of labor is performed and an agreed salary is paid”[30]. Instead, a foreigner’s career came to be entirely dependent on the satisfaction of a Saudi sponsor, who, in the case of disapproval, can end the worker’s residence permit30. What’s more, the statute of “transporting” sponsorship from one sponsor to another commodified foreigners into exchangeable properties with changing values. In light of this, sponsorship resembled a device that empowered the Saudis and promoted them to become, as Marx would put it, class-conscious. Thus, the introduction of sponsorship can be perceived as a modified form of subjugation, where the Saudi sponsor is a proprietor. However, the distinction between the proprietor and the subdued individual in such form of servitude is based solely on citizenship. In this regard, identifying as a Saudi became an exclusive privilege. In concurrence, Abjorn Eide says that citizenship in Saudi Arabia “had functioned as a criterion of social exclusion, by dividing the privileged participants from those who were mere subjects of duties”[31].

Moreover, Saudi status was further consolidated when naturalization laws became inactive, and naturalization was “only possible by a rare special dispensation issued by the government upon petition”[32]. In exceptional cases of naturalization, foreigners were “granted citizenship provided they continue serving in the profession for which they were permitted to naturalize”[33]. Moreover, labor laws in Saudi Arabia require that employment be granted to non-Gulf Arabs and non-Arabs only when there are no national candidates[34]. Unfortunately, such laws are further exploited to the extent that experienced foreigners are almost always paid less than their local counterparts. In addition, some “may be supervised by less experienced and better-paid workers simply”[35] on the basis of nationality. For example, based on a study from the High Commission for Riyadh Development, the mean wage was estimated to be “about US$35,300 for Saudi employees compared to US$5,400 for non-Saudi employees, amounting to an 84.7 per cent wage differential”35.

Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia became “the least absorbent state, coming close to an extreme at which immigrant-origin actors [were] not even incorporated enough to exercise marginal social power”[36]. Instead, they were institutionally marginalized. In particular, Longva’s conception of Saudi Arabia as a “civic ethnocracy,”17 positions the country in conflict with the current globalized view of humanity. Absjorn Eide concurs adding that Saudi Arabia’s ethno-nationalist outlook introduced “serious obstacles to the implementation of human rights”15.  Indeed, in November 2005, just when Saudi Arabia declared amendments to its naturalization statute, GCC[37] Secretary –General Abdul-Rahman AL-Attiya affirmed that International accords are urging the GCC states to absorb expatriates and to treat them justly by “giving them salaries equal to nationals and greater rights in the areas of education and health”[38].

Additionally, the kingdom’s recent enrollment in the World Trade Organization[39] demands not only conformity to global labor-rights but also efficient, high-skilled workers, who take pride of being expeditious; something which Saudi Arabia lacks as “its population has, to a great extent, not been accustomed to working for its income”[40]. Naturalization wouldn’t only satisfy such demands, but it would also get Saudis out of their comfort-zone. As they observe that high-ranking employment positions are being filled by naturalized non-natives, they would hopefully become more competitive. Most probably, the government anticipates that naturalizing qualified foreigners would, on the long-term, alter the “work-ethic” of local Saudis so that “low-prestige jobs currently held by foreigners” become absorbed by native Saudis[41].

Evidently, although it may have some historical roots, it is through the government’s hegemonic rhetoric and legal discourse that such a supremacist perspective became institutionalized. From the former discussion, it becomes obvious how law in Saudi Arabia developed in a specific historical context. By managing the affairs of its non-nationals, the Saudi state had reduced the autonomous scope of its most vital community members, and placed its inactive citizens in dominance. The situation in which Saudi citizens found themselves in, have compelled them to develop a sense of preeminence. In essence, all of that was done to engender self-consciousness of a constitutive Saudi nation.

Additionally, in many ways, the new naturalization policy seems to be a response to global pressures only, whether from the neo-capitalist economy, or human-rights NGO’s. However, it must be noted that re-authorizing naturalization can also be viewed in the context of “Saudization” of the workforce. For example, “Bestowing citizenship on expatriate physicians” [42], though an expedient measure, is one step more towards the kingdom’s self-reliance. Also, as Saudis begin to participate in the global economy, their family ties would dwindle. Gradually, the nuclear family structure would come to dominate; stimulating a more efficient work-ethic.

Although 70% of naturalization applications were rejected in early January 2007,[43] exactly a year after Labor Minister Ghazi Al-Gosaibi anticipated a quota on naturalization[44], many of the remaining 30% are subject to approval. In fact, four months later, the king himself issued a royal decree issuing the citizenship to a considerable number of qualified, high-skilled applicants[45]. In particular, on the same day of the issuing, Al-Gosaibi announced that job-seekers should keep in mind that their “Saudi identity alone would not be enough for them to get jobs”[46]. This ascertains that the government of Saudi Arabia is planning to experience major development in the near future. The degree of naturalization efforts expressed by the state still seems unpredictable.  To what extent would naturalization contribute to the overall development is something that will be more comprehensible in the future.

Bibliography

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11. Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 53
12. Fakkar, Galal. “Many Expats Forced to Send Kids Abroad for Studies”. Arab News. August 31, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=86210&d=31&m=8&y=2006
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16. Department of Civil Status. “The Executive List of the Naturalization System in Saudi Arabia”. http://www.ahwal.gov.sa/production/About/Nationalit/index.asp
17. Quilliam, Neil and Kamel, Maggie. “Modernizing Legitimacy: Saudi Strategies”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.2, No.2: Summer 2003. http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kamel.htm
18. Murawiec, Laurent. Princes of Darkness. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005
19. Joseph, Suad. “Soraya altorki: Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”. Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
20. Madhi, Salah T., and Barrientos, Armando. “Saudisation and employment in Saudi Arabia”. Career Development International. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003. pages 70-77. http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Articles/1370080202.html
21. Aarts, Paul, and Nonneman, Gerd. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. London: Hurst &Company, 2005. page 86.
22. Jerichow, Anders. Saudi Arabia: Outside Global Law and Order. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997. page24
23. “70% of Naturalization Applications Rejected”. The Saudi Gazette. January 13, 2007. http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23392&Itemid=146
24. Abdul Ghafour, P. K. “Naturalization of All Expatriates Is Not Possible, Says Gosaibi”. Arab News. January 17, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=76362&d=17&m=1&y=2006
25. Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “King Grants Citizenship to Number of Applicants”. Arab News. May 5, 2007 http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=95829&d=5&m=5&y=2007
26. Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “Saudization Not for Just Menial Jobs: Gosaibi”. Arab News. May 5, 2007 http://arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=95828&d=5&m=5&y=2007

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[1]Central Department of Statistics. “Work Force Research for 2006”.

[2] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 49

[3] Long, David E. “A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia”. SAIS Review Vol. XXII, No 2: Summer-Fall 2002 page 212

[4] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983 page 669

[5] Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London: Routledge, 2005.page3

[6] Al-Rashed, Abdul Rahman. “Naturalization of Qualified Professionals”. Asharq Alawsat. May 5, 2007.

[7] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 224

[8] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page 6.

[9] Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London: Routledge, 2005.page3

[10] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 122

[11]Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 53

[12] Fakkar, Galal. “Many Expats Forced to Send Kids Abroad for Studies”. Arab News. August 31, 2006.

[13] General Adminstration of Passports “Short History”. http://www.gdp.gov.sa/

[14] Atiyyah, Hamid S. “The Sponsorship System and Infringements of the Rights of Foreign Workers in Gulf Countries”. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol. 3, No.4, 1990. page.270

[15] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 100

[16] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 180

[17] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[18] Long, David E. “A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia”. SAIS Review Vol. XXII, No 2: Summer-Fall 2002 page224

[19] “Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East”(p.219)

[20] Doumato, Eleanor A. “Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.1: 1992. page39

[21] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[22] Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia: Washington D.C. “The Basic Law of Governance”

[23] “‘Inter-National’ Marriages Rife With Obstacles, Fraud”. Arab News. September18, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=86727&d=18&m=9&y=2006

[24] Department of Civil Status. “The Executive List of the Naturalization System in Saudi Arabia”. http://www.ahwal.gov.sa/production/About/Nationalit/index.asp

[25] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 49

[26] Quilliam, Neil and Kamel, Maggie. “Modernising Legitimacy: Saudi Strategies”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.2, No.2: Summer 2003.

http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kamel.htm

[27] Doumato, Eleanor A. “Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.1: 1992. page39

[28] Murawiec, Laurent. Princes of Darkness. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. page.219

[29] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 33

[30] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[31] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 99

[32]Joseph, Suad. “Soraya altorki: Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”. Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

[33] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983. page 674

[34] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page8

[35] Madhi, Salah T., and Barrientos, Armando. “Saudisation and employment in Saudi Arabia”. Career Development International. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003. pages 70-77.

[36] Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 55

[37] Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman

Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page8.

[39] Aarts, Paul, and Nonneman, Gerd. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. London: Hurst &Company, 2005. page 86.

[40] Jerichow, Anders. Saudi Arabia: Outside Global Law and Order. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997. page24

[41] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page 13.

[42] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983 page 674

[43] “70% of Naturalization Applications Rejected”. The Saudi Gazette. January 13, 2007.

[44] Abdul Ghafour, P. K. “Naturalization of All Expatriates Is Not Possible, Says Gosaibi”. Arab News. January 17, 2006.

[45] Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “King Grants Citizenship to Number of Applicants”. Arab News. May 5, 2007

[46] Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “Saudization Not for Just Menial Jobs: Gosaibi”. Arab News. May 5, 2007

Medieval Islam: a Conflict between Reform and Revival

Islamic Renaissance and the Failure of a Reformation:

a Wrangle Between Philosophy and Religion

 Since the 1980’s, politics within the Muslim world have played a major role in developing debates over the compatibility of Islam within the modern world. Recently, the tragic events of 9/11 drew a greater attention to examining Islamic ideology, and sparked a controversy on the need for an Islamic Reformation. In light of that, Western scholars, and some Muslim intellectuals emphasized the urgent need for a comprehensive restructuring of Islam. Alternatively, religious thinkers opposed such propositions claiming their insincerity and their inherent secular and Western character. Others argue that the concept of a reformation is not alien to Islamic history. They claim that Muslims have recognized and appreciated the concept of reformation long before the Christians did. In reference to such a viewpoint, scholars questioned the triumph of such efforts and asserted their failure. Through a historical examination of Islam, scholars observed that medieval Islamic culture encompassed a discourse on the philosophy of religion. Moreover, they confirm that such a discourse articulated hopes for a Reformation. Though, they attribute the failure of that Reformation to the hypocrisy of political and religious leaders.

In the beginning, to understand the concept of Reformation, one must consider the foundations of the European Reformation. First, throughout the early medieval centuries, Europe sunk into a period of darkness and ignorance. At that time the only central authority that united most of Europe was the Papacy of the Catholic Church at the Vatican. This absence of nation-states ended when various royalties took control over different regions of Europe. Gradually, conflicts within the different states and the central church weakened the absolute authority of the Church.  This decline in the influence of the Catholic Church triggered the European Renaissance.

Furthermore, Renaissance, as defined by Margoliouth, is the “recovery of classical art (from antiquity), literature and science, which during the Dark and the earlier Middle Ages had been neglected” (p. I)[1]. During this period, great intellectual achievements have taken place throughout Italy as a result of the scientific revival of ancient Roman and Greek science. The discovery of the works of Galen’s on anatomy and Ptolemy on Geography gave the birth of new scientific revelations. Leaders of the scientific Renaissance include Galileo and Da Vinci, whose works formed the basis of modern Science. Moreover, al-Khowarismy work on Algebra, which reached Europe through the crusades, also had a great influence on the development of mathematics. In addition, the interactions with the Muslims through the conquest of Spain introduced translations of classical Greek philosophy to Europe. The Muslim scholar Ibn-Rushed, known as Averroës in the west, was the leader of the movement that developed Aristotle’s scholasticism. This humanistic revival shifted Latin literature to a new phase.

This new thriving culture emphasized critical thinking and encouraged skepticism. As a result, new interpretations of the bible and religious traditions initiated a spiritual-awakening. This free-thinking approach allowed thinkers to voice their concerns over the Church’s repressions. Additionally, political tensions between the Catholic Papacy and the various European states contributed to greater widespread criticism. Initiated by a few unorganized theologians, such as Martin Luther, a Revolution against the Church began. With the aid of religious philosophers, political leaders from Germany and England established the Reformation[2].

Accordingly, the Reformation stemmed from long periods of struggle and a series of intellectual revival, which the Christian World had to undergo to reach such a theological and political reform.  On the other hand, the existence of many revolutionary campaigns in the Muslim world makes it hard to agree on a specific period of Reformation or even to define the nature of such a reformation.  This complex and dynamic nature of political medieval Islam differentiated it from Christianity and, as a result, the nature of an Islamic Reformation would differ from its Christian counterpart. Further, Roberson explains that “Islam, as a religion, was able, through the behavior of its believer, to continually remain cognizant of the social, economic and political condition of the time it was passing through. It was like the passage of a long series of intermittent ‘mini-reformations’, all the while the basic structure of the religion was maintained including the law, rather than the experience of one great all-mighty reformation as in Europe”[3]. Here a distinction must be made between the Protestant Reformation in Europe and the Reformation within the context of Islam. First, unlike the Catholic Church in Renaissance Europe, the Muslim World lacked a central religious authority. Secondly, the continuous refusal of the Muslim community to create “further split” in it eliminates the many difficulties that the leaders of the Protestant Reformation had to face to separate from Catholicism[4].

In the context of this paper, an Islamic Reformation corresponds to constructing an inclusive humanistic approach to theology which allows intellectual criticism and, yet maintains the central structure of Islam. In other words, a Reformation must result in a comprehensive and flexible system that preserves the continual development of the economic, intellectual, social and political status of the Muslim community and the human civilization. However, there is a current debate over the concept of an Islamic Reformation. In a private meeting Mrs. Sherine Ebadi, the first Muslim women to win a Nobel Prize, expressed to me that she would rather call it an “Islamic Revival.” Her fear emerges from the fact that the term “Reformation” provokes a greater controversy and hinders the renewal of Islam, since the term is always associated with the split of Christianity. Nevertheless, the term “Islamic revival” has recently turned to a cliché that is used by various movements that extensively differ in their objective. As we will see later, Revivalism has been associated sometimes with groups that challenged efforts of Reform. Still, we can define Revivalism as movements that claim to represent the return to the ‘true and original form of Islam.’

Looking back at the roots of the Christian Reformation, we saw that the revolution was based on the intellectual prosperity of the Renaissance. Thus, to study the history of Reform in Islam we first have to examine the Islamic Renaissance.  In the context of Islamic History, Renaissance refers to the philosophers, scientists and theologians whom works have contributed profoundly to the emergence of the European Renaissance. This implies that Renaissance in the Muslim world have started earlier than that of Europe’s. Antony Black confirms: “the east was intellectually superior to the West in jurisprudence, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, and philosophy until around 1200. Early Islam was more open that pre-twelfth century Christendom to foreign and ancient ideas.”[5] The Muslims didn’t only translate Greek science and philosophy. However, they also developed it. Ibn-Sina’s, known as Avicenna in the Latin world, works on anatomy and medicine rivaled that of Hippocrates and Galen. Similarly, commentaries of Al-Faraby on Aristotle’s theories added an additional perspective to early Renaissance Italy. However, the most influential Muslim thinker was Ibn-Rushed, whose significance was even celebrated by Raphael’s famous ‘School of Athens’ painting.

To begin with, Al-Faraby is known to be the first influential philosopher of the Golden Age of Islam. As with most other Muslim philosophers, Faraby seeked education by himself; “he didn’t belong to the court, bureaucracy or any literary group”[6]. However, Greek philosophy was introduced to him through a Christian teacher of the Alexandrian school. Faraby’s revolutionary concept of the philosophical nature of Prophecy and religion meant that philosophy itself is of divine nature. While such thoughts heavily conflicted with the Sunni school of thought, Shiites “enthusiastically adopted al-Faraby’s political ideas”.  Faraby saw that “religion is an imitation of philosophy.” Moreover, because “philosophy demonstrates what religion symbolizes”, “Philosophy is ‘true education’ and the way to Salvation” [7]. In the later part of his life he wrote his most distinguished books that constituted the development of Aristotle’s work. His book, the Virtuous City, represented his detailed vision of the ideal Caliphate. Additionally, he used Plato’s work to form the basic attributes of a Caliph[8].

In Plato’s perspective, knowledge was the essential qualifier for leadership. Such view corresponded to that of the Shiites. Both Shiites and the Faraby believed that the propagation of knowledge and virtue, which is necessary to the development of the human civilization, required not only political regulations but a virtuous leadership. This “affinity between Philosophy and Shi’ism” triggered the Shiite Hamdanids Caliphate to invite al-Faraby to Aleppo. The construction of the Houses of Wisdom in Mosul, Aleppo and Tripoli shows the Shiite appreciation of Greek philosophy. Another reason for al-Faraby’s abandonment of Baghdad, which was the central intellectual city of his time, is the increasing popularity of Hanbali Sunnism.

In this regard, Ahmed Ibn-Hanbal was a theologian that initiated a movement that denied the option of innovations in dealing with religion. Unlike al-Faraby, Ibn Hanbal believed that it’s the religious duty of the people to comply with their leader regardless of his actions with the exception of apostasy and the absence of communal prayer[9]. In addition, he denigrated every form of rational speculation. His literary movement came from his rejection of the rational approach of reading the Quran. This conflict between traditional Islam and philosophy developed in the Abbasid Caliphate with the accession of al-Ma’mun. Al-Ma’mun was interested in Greek philosophy. Therefore, he attracted Shiites and Mu’tazilites, who opposed literalism. At his time, Baghdad, especially with his construction of the House of Wisdom, became the center of intellectual discourse. This approach cultivated philosophers such as Faraby and Avicenna, and equated their academic status to that of religious scholars. Alternatively, to illustrate his tolerant policies and theory of Deputyship, Ma’mun deliberately designated the Shiite eighth Imam, Ali Al-Ridha, as his successor, and retained Mu’tazilte thinkers in authoritative positions.

This spread of philosophy and Shiite teachings triggered Ibn-Hanbal to publicly expose his distaste to philosophers. He taught that philosophers blind individuals from recognizing the truth, and in this manner, they deviate people from the ‘true Islam.’ “To call a man a philosopher was still to brand him as a heretic or infidel”[10] Moreover, the fierce dispute between philosophers and Hannibal’s Sunni beliefs emerged when Ibn-Hanbal “took to the streets proclaiming that it was the duty of the Deputy to command t good and forbid the evil, that is, to enforce the Shari’a in public life”. In one way or another, this implied that Al-Ma’mun wasn’t fulfilling his duty as a Caliph. Expectedly, Al-Ma’mun responded with imprisoning Hanbal. Al-Ma’mun’s action depicts the only occasion in the entire history of Islam in which a Caliph chooses rationalism prior to religion. In this regard, one can come to see some resemblance between Philip, the Magnanimous of Renaissance Germany, and al-Ma’mun. Both championed innovative religious notions and condoned liturgical attitudes toward religion. Additionally, Al-Ma’mun’s theory of deputyship also resembled that of the small republics that existed in Italian Renaissance. In this manner, Al-Ma’mun “adopted a cultural policy that was designed to boost high culture and the intellectual standing of the Caliphate”[11].Thus, to Islamic Renaissance, al-Ma’mun was the founder. His initiative of institutionalizing philosophy as well as his interest to a multiethnic and religiously variant society corresponded to the only possible Reformation in Islam. For the first time in any Caliphate, and perhaps the only time, Al-Ma’mun, as a leader, demonstrated that “the ruler must be loved by his people and combine clemency with severity”[12].  Indeed, with severity he dealt with literalism and compassion with those who were tolerant.

As a result of the thriving intellectual culture in Baghdad, Avicenna came to being. Avicenna believed not only that philosophy can be superior to religion, but that it can interact with the human’s active intuition, which he claimed to emanate from God. In other words, Avicenna meant that regular humans can, through mysticism along with philosophy, exceed limits and possibly achieve Prophecy.  Challenges to Sunnism continued with al-Razi’s skeptics in concepts such as Revelation and Prophecy. He defied his Sunni background when “he called Socrates ‘the Imam’”, arguing that if intellectual enlightenment is sufficient to prove the existence of God, then “Prophecy and revelation are unnecessary; indeed they are harmful because they retard knowledge and cause wars”[13].

In comparison, and in the endorsement of the traditional Sunni school of literalism, Ibn Hazm composed a love story in which he tried to establish that “plain language” is the only way one in which one can understand the sacred texts.[14] Thus, Quran can only have an apparent meaning; allegorical approaches to the Quran used by Sunni philosophers were deemed unacceptable. Because of his scholar standing and his position as the Ummayed’s Vizier, Ibn Hazm thoughts on philosophy gave some legitimacy to the Ummayed’s rule in Spain. As we will see, the end of the Ummayed’s rule corresponded also to the beginning of rational thinking in Muslim Spain and the emergence of thinkers such as Ibn Tufail and Ibn Rushed.

During that period of time, particularly in the center of the Muslim World, Sunnism school of thought still didn’t prevail against the campaign of philosophy. It only became well established when AlGhazaly, around the 11th century, wrote his famous book, Destructio Philosopherum , condemning the works of Faraby and Avicenna. Al-Gahzaly got the public’s approval because he relied on his personal experience. His arguments were based upon his conversations with philosophers, Shiites, and Sufis. In addition, his book, Revival, also was revolutionary, since it’s the first time that a theologian truly criticizes the ‘Ulama in their tactics within the political authorities, which focus on the establishment of the traditional Sunni school instead on the correct implementation of Shari’a. What’s more, Ghazaly also accepted Sufi thoughts and indeed embraced them in the latter part of his life. Further, he developed the predominantly rigid nature of Sunnism to a school of thought that encourages science and mathematics[15].  This increasing flexibility of Sunnism, together with his denunciation of philosophy, distinguished Al-Ghazaly and compared his influence on mainstream Islam to that of Thomas Aquinas in Catholicism. [16] Both theologians persisted that religion and science, are in fact, related.

On the other side of the Muslim world, the fall of the Almoravids dynasty in Muslim Spain, which included the decline of the restrictive Sunni atmosphere, as well as the rise of the intellectually vibrant environment of Almohads’ Cordova promoted Averroës’ interest in exploring science and philosophy beside Islamic Jurisprudence. His natural interest in medicine gave birth to his medical encyclopedia, the Colliget. His companionship with Ibn-Tufail, a philosopher who he shared interest in medicine with, launched him to embark upon the study of philosophy. The open-minded theology of Almohads allowed him to further develop his thoughts without the usual Sunni restrictions.[17] In Europe, he was considered as the true interpreter of Aristotle. However, some Christian theologians such as Albertus Magnus, the teacher of Thomas Aquinas, deemed him “godless and the enemy of Christ.” [18] Again, this relates to the resemblance of Thomas Aquinas and Al-Ghazaly. Indeed, both of them, though advocates of science, viewed Averroes’ pure philosophy as contradictory to the nature of religion. In defense of philosophy, Averroes wrote a detailed refutation, called the Incoherence of the Incoherence, to Al-Ghazaly’s degradation of Philosophy.

More than any other thinkers of his time, Averroes applied and traced his work on Plato’s politics through Islamic history. This indicated that he, unlike Faraby’s ideal vision, tried to relate Greek politics into Muslim political history in an attempt to establish a future change. His unparalleled, both in Europe and the Muslim world, feminist observations in which he attributed economic regression to the subordination of women in society, provoked religious leaders to publicly condemn him. Black explains, “Supporters of Sunni Legalism saw a clear contradiction between religion and philosophy, and they were now suppressing the practice of philosophy and persecuting philosophers, including Ibn Rushed himself”[19].  Markedly, Ibn Rushed was beyond comparison to all of Islamic thinkers. His Sunni status and his revolutionary ideas distinguish him as the supreme Islamic thinker. Being a Sunni at that time implied a certain ideology that Ibn-Rushed clearly transcended while still adhering to Sunnism. Those reasons illustrate the similarities of Ibn-Rushed and Martin Luther. This suggests the possibility of Reformation if Ibn-Rushed were tolerated.

On the other hand, the Shiite school of thought believed that philosophy and implicit understanding are the keys to the sincere interpretations of theology. Thus, the pursuit for a philosophical Islam didn’t die out with Ibn-Rushd’s sad end. In fact, Shiite theology encouraged the use of philosophy, mathematics, astronomy and science in interpreting the sacred texts. Al-Tusi exemplified that approach and developed. Tusi was born in the far eastern end of the Muslim Empire. Although he was the only thinker of his time, Tusi’s influence exceeded the boundaries of his Shiite beliefs. First, as a Shiite theologian, unlike his Sunni cotemporaries, Tusi held that Shari’a isn’t absolute, and that interpretations by the experts, who he called Mujtahids, are within the scope of the divine laws. Further, the concept of Ijtihad, which is done by the Mujtahids, “gave the Shiite legal system flexibility and dynamism; it enabled new question to be take seriously. Above all, it elevated Reason.”[20] This individual reasoning resembles democracy, as it enables dialogue over theology within the Shiite sect, let alone with other Muslim schools of thought. Secondly, his political theories also embraced an unparalleled democratic thinking within the Islamic Renaissance. Tusi proposed a political theory of love through which he “saw the rule by the people as part of virtuous government”.[21] He believed that “the love of good men for one another” blends and connects different societies into one civilization. Antony says that “this was the kind of view of human nature that one would find two centuries later in Italian Renaissance thinkers”[22] Critics believed that “Tusi transmitted elements of classical Islamic political philosophy to the early modern world”[23]. However, a simultaneous but different movement evolved in the center of the Muslim World after Tusi’s death.

Just as Hanbalism opposed Faraby and Avicenna in the beginning of the Renaissance, Ibn Taymia’s applied his dogma in opposition to al-Tusi’s and, thereby ending the Renaissance. Though he was less literal than Ibn-Hanbal, Ibn-Taymia propagated his teachings by refuting other schools of thoughts. He engaged in regular disputation with Shiite leaders. Those controversies influenced his promotion of a Sunni form of Ijtihad. However, his Ijtihad opposed any innovations. He viewed innovations as the path of deviation to the ‘errant’ beliefs of Suffism and Christianity[24]. On the political scope, Ibn-Taymia enforced Ibn-Hanbal’s theory of the religious political leader. In fact, he loathed the abstention of religious participation in political authorities. “Ibn Taymia was particularly insistent that religion cannot be practiced without state power” [25]. In fact, Ibn-Taymia was the first thinker to portray former Islamic Caliphs as exemplary political rulers. His “special admiration for the first four Deputies, and also for the Seljuks, Nur al-Din and Salah al-Din and the Mamluk Sultans,”[26] formed the basis of the modern historical view of early Islam. In this regard, Ibn-Taymia disapproved the discussion of the disputes that occurred within the early politics of Islam. Namely, he prohibited arguments over the Sahaba, or prophet’s companions; questioning the Sahaba, a Shiite practice, meant deviation from Sunnism. Thus, Ibn-Taymia was very successful in his attempts of establishing his model of religious reform. Above all, his main objective was to integrate religion in every political aspect. His ideal model of the Sahaba and the Salaf, who are early Islam’s true followers, and his proposition of Ijtihad, came to balance one another in religious-legal practice. Eventually, the beginnings of the 14^th century marked the end of the age of Renaissance within the history of mainstream Islam. In particular, the last original thinkers, Tusi, as a philosopher, and Ibn Taymia, as a religious scholar, concluded the golden age of Islam.

At the end of such a review of the complex movements during Renaissance Islam, one wonders what would have been the implications if Ibn-Rushd’s thoughts were tolerated within the Muslim community. Would it influence them as it did to their counter Christians? Although Muslim philosophers were more successful in relating Greek philosophy to Islam, than the Europeans did to Christianity, the absence of philosophical institutions which increase communication among the intellectual community made Islamic Renaissance less coherent than that of Europe. Intellectual institutions were usually built to solely encompass religious scholars whom, as usual, rejected philosophical approaches to the sacred text. Blank asserts that “most philosophers were self-educated.”[27] We probably can speculate that similar changes to that of Europe would have taken place only with the tolerance and institutionalization of Philosophy. The ruling government plays a pivotal role in determining those two circumstances.

Ironically, the absence of a single, central and tyrannical power, such as the Papacy in Europe, perhaps, made the Muslims overlook the idea of Reformation.[28] Islamic leaders didn’t take up extensive power similar to that of the Catholic Church until the end of Renaissance. Then, influenced mainly by Ibn-Taymia, all post-Renaissance dynasties, both Shiite and Sunni, became manipulated by religious authorities. Antony Blank illustrates that “Orthodox-minded ‘Ulama could charge anyone who showed independence of mind, especially if they criticized the ‘Ulama themselves, with heresy and unbelief. In such cases, the Sultan, if he were to maintain his status as religious leader, had to be seen to act. Sufis were persecuted from time to time and any one who expressed doubts about the Quran.” Even more, “1n 1580, an observatory as modern as any in Europe was destroyed, just three years after being built.”[29] Evidently, Ibn-Taymia’s spreading ideology ensured the failure of any kind of Reformation. Sultanates’ need for religion to justify their legitimacy made it difficult for the ruler to exclude religious authorities from the political realm. As a result, any scientific or intellectual development, such as the construction of institutions or the funding of research, was based on the degree of tolerance that Religious authorities rule with.

 Although not nearly as sever as the politics that followed it, Renaissance politics also abused the function of religion to justify their rule. In our former review of Renaissance leaders, we discussed three main revivalist movements: Ibn-Hanbal, Al-Ghazaly, and Ibn-Taymia. We previously saw, that Ibn-Taymia’s post-Renaissance political influence surpassed that of any other Renaissance philosophers or religious academics. Nonetheless, the other two thinkers generated critical political changes during the Renaissance.

First, Hanbalism, as the first enemy of philosophy, played an important role in developing the thoughts of the other two movements that followed it. To philosophers, the Sunni movement represented incoherence and contradictions. Moreover, Hanbalis claimed that human intellect cannot justify everything in the world, and, in fact, is not supposed to. Most of the time they would say “ask not how”[30]. Their belief that Shari’a’ law is the divine law that guides human behavior, implied that “To be moral one virtually must be Muslim”[31]. This theory shattered the unity of the Muslim community because it made Islam exclusive to a school of thought and alienated non-Muslims from the rest of the Muslim community. After all, “within the Caliphate itself were many people who had not embraced Islam, for instance Christians, Jews, atheists, Mazdaans, idolaters, Buddhists, Gnostics, and son.”[32]Conversely, philosophers believed that religious differences among a community rather promote discussion and mutual gain of knowledge. In contrast to philosophy, Ibn Hanbal’s approach to leadership made Sunnism a perfect religious system that can maintain its structure through the dynamic nature of Muslim politics. The Suljks exploited such ideology, especially in dealing with their Shiite enemy, the Buyids dynasty.  With the accession of the Al-Qadir, the first Seljuk Caliph, execution of non-Sunnis such as Mu’tazilites and Shiites became the essential tool to end theological and philosophical disputations. Sourdel comments on the reference of Suljks to themselves as the ‘champions of Sunnism’, “No one can tell how sincere their Sunnism was, but what is important is that they could not claim to dominate such a vast empire without taking up a stance on religious questions.”[33]

Secondly, al-Ghazaly represented a more moderate, and different approach to traditional Sunnism that is far from literalism. In fact, al-Ghazaly accommodated science and increased the capacity of developing the Shari’a within Sunnism. Since he lived in a Shiite dominant Egypt under the Fatimid rule, it was hard for him to share his teachings with the public. However, his renewal to Sunni thinking and his strong arguments against philosophy captured the attention of several political authorities outside of Egypt. Particularly, al-Ghazaly paved the roads to the accession of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt. “The Ayyubids were devoted advocates of political Sunnism, and collaborated with the ‘Ulama.”[34] In fact, Saladin, who is the founder of this dynasty, was proclaimed as “the restorer of Sunnism in Egypt”[35]. He radically eradicated Shiites and their philosophy in the fear of threats to his new empire.  In this regard, Sourdel argues that it was only until he established his Muslim Empire that Saladin thought of recapturing Jerusalem. Sourdel also confirms that Saladin had to engage in a counter-crusade due to the fact that his denial to the religious leaders’ demands for the restoration of Jerusalem would threaten the legitimacy of his kingdom[36].  

Clearly, each of the three thinkers had a distinct approach to the character and nature of the Islamic Law, which depended on his current environment. This demonstrated Islam’s capability of diverse interpretations even in the most traditional Sunni school. Such tolerance can also differentiate it from medieval Christian Catholicism. In the case of Islam, one can generalize that Muslims during the Renaissance didn’t experience radical narrow-minded manipulations of religion, as the Christians did in Europe. Hence, they believed that neither Muslims nor Islam needed a reconstruction.

Again, ruling kingdoms exploited the people’s faith in the integrity of Islam, and have always sought to contain knowledge and setup limits to intellectual upbringing. Unlike religious authorities, their motives were insincere and far from any concerns with preserving religious authenticity. Incidentally, in an interview on U.C. Berkeley’s TV channel, Tariqh Ali, editor of the New Left Review, said “I really do not believe that they want citizens in this world to think. They don't want that. They want a population which is more or less servile, which listens to them, accepts all they say, a population which is obsessed with consumerism and fornication, and carries on doing that. That they don't mind at all. That's fine. But anything beyond that which challenges them, they more or less stopped.”[37]

In addition, some ruling dynasties in the Renaissance made extensive efforts to establish intellectual institutions. However, their intentions weren’t genuine. For example, funding institutions and promotion of learning were at the heart of the Shiite Fatimid rule. In fact, the first university in the Muslim world was built by them. Through the endorsement to learning, Shiite Fatimids found a diplomatic strategy that stabilizes their rule over the predominantly Sunni Egyptians. Unlike the Seljuks, Fatimids intelligently used the propagation of their teachings in converting Egypt to Shiite majority. Tariqh Ali confirms this in his analogy of such intellectual manipulation to the recent collapse in the media. He says “Channel 4, which was set up in 1982 to be an innovative, critical television channel (it was set up by Parliament) -- by the middle to end of the nineties had collapsed. A lot of experimental, very good work was done, but then it came to an end and it's almost as if one can trace this end to the collapse of the communist enemy; that with the ending of that, it's almost as if the rulers of this world, the dominant capitalist world, decided, ‘We don't need to educate our citizens so much. We have nothing to be worried about. If you educate them too much, give them too many opportunities, make them too vigilant and alert, they might actually turn on us.’ I'm not saying this is how they thought it concretely, but certainly that's how it seemed to one, that that's what they were trying to do. The dumbing-down seemed sudden, that one day the networks were actually quite intelligent, and then six months later everything had disappeared.”[38] Surprisingly, the dynamic tool that served political changes in the medieval ages (i.e. heresy), is still used, and serves similar purposes.

Evidently, a true Reformation is one that develops within ethical politics. In other words, regardless of their differences, all Renaissance philosophically-based political theories were based on the notion of the supremacy of knowledge and virtue. Clearly, their theories only serve as ideal paradigms that, in reality, cannot be fully applied. Whether now, or in the medieval ages, politics have always lacked virtue. Apparently, philosophers themselves realized the practical failure of their idealist theories which is a clear answer to why they avoided any actual discussion of the politics of their time. Yet, adopting a philosophical outlook on religion carries with it a persistent hope for a virtuous civilization.

In view of that, I believe that if Ibn-Rushed and Al-Ma’mun coexisted, just like the case with Philip and Luther, then mainstream Islam of today would be certainly different than it is now. Our examination to the Renaissance period shows that the concept of an Islamic Reformation is rooted within the history of Islam. It’s neither a product of modernism, nor Westernization. In addition, it became evident that an Islamic Reformation shouldn’t necessarily result in secularism. In fact, rational reasoning and religion, as Faraby argued, are one entity. However, what hinders a Reformation is the abuse of censorship. In reference to our former discussion, we saw that censorship was misused by both politicians and theologians because it limited intellectual discourse. The former used censorship to guarantee authority and the latter used it out of ignorance. In addition, one must be careful not confuse Reformation with modernist movements. While Reformation can correspond to certain religiosity, modernism entails secularism, and therefore is more anti-religious. Again, the currently increasing popularity of an Islamic Reformation is the excessive censorship that religious authorities and governments impose on the people. The frustration and anger of Muslims all over the world expresses how they are fed up with religious deceit and government fabrication. This growing dissatisfaction might one day develop into a Reformation. Incidentally, Reformation within Christianity didn’t occur until the 16^th century, meaning 1600 years after its birth. Interestingly enough, the Muslims have just celebrated the 1427^th anniversary of the establishment of their religion. Based on this and the Muslims’ increasing frustration, one can predict that Islam is on the verge of a new age: the age of Reformation.

---

[1] Mez, Adam. The Renaissance of Islam. New York: AMS Press Inc, 1975. Page I

[2] “Renaissance.” In: Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance

[3] Roberson, B. A., The Shaping of the Current Islamic Reformation, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers USA, 2003. Page 5.

[4] Safi, Omid. Encyclopedia of Religion, Modernism: Islamic Modernism. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005, under the subtopic of “An Islamic Reformation?”

[5] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. Page 57.

[6] [6] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. Page 61

[7] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 63.

[8] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 63.

[9] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 37.

[10] Patricia Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd UK, 2004. Page168.

[11] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 26

[12] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 27

[13] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 63.

[14] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 83

[15] Franco Cardini, Europe and Islam. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd USA, 2001. Page 92

[16] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 106

[17] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 117

[18] Franco Cardini, Europe and Islam. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd USA, 2001. Page 92

[19] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 124

[20]  Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 150

[21] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 150

[22] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 147

[23] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 152

[24] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 153

[25] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 153

[26] [26] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 157

[27] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 60

[28] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 143

[29] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 215

[30] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 83.

[31] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 84

[32] Maurice Lombard, The Golden Age of Islam. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company USA, 1975. Page 97.

[33] Dominique Sourdel, Medieval Islam. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul USA 1983. Page182.

[34] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 109

[35] Antony Blank, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge Publishers USA, 2001. page 144.

[36] Dominique Sourdel, Medieval Islam. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul USA 1983. Page183.

[37] Ali, Tariqh. Islam, “Empire and the Left” In: Conversations with History. The Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley. May 8, 2003

http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/Elberg/Ali/ali-con0.html

[38] Ali, Tariqh. Islam, “Empire and the Left” In: Conversations with History. The Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley. May 8, 2003

http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/Elberg/Ali/ali-con0.html

Bibliography

1. Black, Antony. The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge, 2001.
2. Lombard, Maurice. The Golden Age of Islam. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1975.
3. Crone, Patricia. Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004.
4. Roberson, R.A. Shaping the Current Islamic Reformation. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003.
5. Cardini, Franco. Europe and Islam. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001
6. “Renaissance.” In: Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance