Institutionalized Hegemony: Saudi Identity through the Legal Discourse of Citizenship

Institutionalized Hegemony: 

Saudi Identity through the 

Legal Discourse of Citizenship

Mohammad Fuad AlJishi

According to the 2006 statistical study about the workforce in Saudi Arabia, which was conducted by the Central Department of Statistics, only 49% out of more than 8 million workers were Saudi citizens[1]. In Saudi Arabia, foreign workforce participates in all fields of industry and significantly contributes to the stability of the daily lives of millions of Saudis both socially and economically. In 2005, Saudi Arabia reopened its doors into accepting naturalization applications of foreigners. Under the pressures of globalization, Saudi Arabia had to appropriately absorb its massive population of non-nationals. Long-forgotten generations of immigrant workers have been residing in the kingdom, yet they have always maintained their own sphere, becoming socially segregated from the locals. In reality, the country was stratified into two identities: one of the nationals and one of the non-nationals.

Generally, law plays an instrumental role in creating identities and categorizing individuals as it constructs privileges to some, and advantages to others.  Bearing that in mind, this paper outlines the manner through which the Saudi government discursively constructed a hegemonic image that was articulated through the legal affairs of its citizens and resident-aliens. The paper reveals that the Saudi government’s successful methodology of inspiring a national common identity hinges upon a narrative in which economy, society and politics are all connected and conceptualized in imagined synchronism[2]. Specifically, I argue that the Saudi legal discourse of citizenship, infused into other laws that regulate the status of foreigners, such as naturalization, residency permits, and sponsorship programs, forged a common identity among its subjects; an identity that is not only deliberately outlined so as to exclude non-nationals, but also one that promotes the supremacy of Saudis. Further, in order to play a more active role in the current global economy, Saudi Arabia would have to adjust that identity; and one way to achieve such a change is through reviving its naturalization policy.

To begin with, the history of naturalization in Saudi Arabia goes back to the founding of the country in 1932. At that early phase, the inhabitants of the Middle East were still unfamiliar with the emerging borders that divided their vast land into separate states. Indeed, former CEO of Aramco Oil Company affirms that “when he first arrived in the kingdom in late 1937, virtually no persons considered themselves Saudis”[3]. With such impressions in mind, an influx of Arabs from neighboring territories arrived to the newly established kingdom. Many of them immigrated not only to escape the harsh conditions of colonial rule in their respective regions, but also to contribute to the building of the government and economy of the Saudi state. For the founders, not only such immigration was unobjectionable but it was necessary to the development of the state. Because Saudi Arabia experienced little Ottoman domination and no Western colonization, the country was not familiar with any modern system of administration[4]. Thus, the king made comprehensive efforts to indiscriminately recruit and naturalize any immigrant community. Madawi Al-Rasheed asserts that the king naturalized African, Indian, European and Persian communities[5]. Abdul-Rahman Al-Rashid remarks that “King Abdulaziz appointed non-Saudis as ambassadors, ministers and advisors” where “they offered great services to the young state at that early and crucial stage”[6]. However, with the advent of political contentions between Arab countries in the 1960’s, naturalization became rare[7]. Such halt of naturalization, took place on the advent of a Saudi economic boom, which, as Al-Rasheed remarks, ultimately consolidated the “distinctions between ‘insiders and outsiders’”.

During the politically volatile period of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the kingdom experienced several dissident movements, which, in many cases, were initiated by non-native Saudis[8]. As a result, the government was “eager to distribute lavish benefits to those who are defined as nationals” in an effort to avert the public from politics and gain the people’s loyalty[9]. Moreover, to support such a lavish lifestyle as well as a rapidly thriving economy, the government had to import millions of cheap foreign workers, particularly from South and Southeast Asia. Such sudden presence of a substantial foreign workforce in all levels of society threatened the so-called “Saudi cultural integrity,” and made the Saudis feel as though they were a minority[10]. In this context, the government was forced to take strong measures to restrain foreigners and differentiate them from nationals. For example, “only Saudi citizens had a right to higher education, property ownership, and permanent residence”[11]. Not being able to accommodate millions of non-Saudi children in public schools, the Saudi government introduced quotas that restrict the number of non-Saudis in public schools to 3-5% of the total school population[12]. As a result, 90% of expatriates were forced “to choose the more expensive option of sending their children to private schools”12. What’s more, in the early 1980’s, and in the process of separating the Passport Department from the Civil Status Department[13], the government reinforced its Internal Passport system, known as Iqama, which is a residential permit, by introducing a “sponsorship program,” which entitled a Saudi “sponsor” to dominate a “sponsored” foreign worker[14]. By 1992, and after the Gulf War crisis, the king Fahd issued a royal decree that delineated the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia.

In reference to such history, just as it originated in late 18^th century France[15], citizenship and residency regulations in the kingdom were introduced to minimize disruptions not only by aliens but also by internal divisions. For example, the sponsorship system was an effective vehicle through which people practiced their longing for power instead of being occupied by familial, tribal, or even political rivalries.

In fear of local diversity and in an effort to homogenize its subjects, the Saudi state attempted to define or rather construct ethnic commonalities by emphasizing religion, language, and genealogy. Specifically, the high selectivity of the kingdom’s “jus sanguinis conception of citizenship”36contributed to the gradual construction of a hegemonic paradigm of ethno-nationalism that, as Anh Longva states, revolves around an “imagined” [16], “natural and ethnically pure community”[17].

To begin with, although Arab speaking nations extend from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, certain nations tended to emphasize their Arab ancestry more than others; most distinguished of these is Saudi Arabia. As David Long corroborates “virtually all Saudis belong to an extended family”[18]. In fact, most identify with a specific tribe and “value blood-ties even more than money”18. In this regard, Saudis identify themselves in a collective manner rather on individual basis18. Thus, because indigenous Saudis appreciated kinship much more than statehood,[19] the Saudi state had to present itself in a manner that attaches statehood to every subject[20]. To accomplish this, the founding Al-Saud clan portrayed their kingdom as if it was a huge tribe inclusive of all Saudi citizens, “with the monarchy fulfilling the patriarchal obligations of the tribal sheik [i.e. leader]”20. Therefore, just as Saudi citizenship naturally emerged from such patrilineally “shared descent,”[21] so did the stringency of the naturalization process; the king had to preserve the honor of the kingdom just as the sheik used to guard the admission to his tribe20. Such a tribal paradigm evolved gradually culminating with the issuing of the Basic law in 1992.  Hence, it is no wonder that Articles 9 and 10, respectively, of Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law of Governance specifically declare that “the family is the nucleus of Saudi society,”[22] and that “the state shall aspire to promote family bonds”22.

Taking that in consideration, and as tribalism entails the necessity of keeping “the blood-lines pure”20, marriages between Saudis and non-nationals seemed inconceivable to the state, and thus invalid. Because marrying non-Saudi nationals was no longer tolerable, and naturalization was not an option, the only way that foreigners could legally live with their Saudi spouses was by applying for  a home-working visa, in which they were assigned a legal status of a ‘housekeeper’[23]. “Furthermore, custody disputes favor the Saudi parent and often rules in favor of men [emphasizing the state’s patriarchal values], putting non-Saudi women at greater risk of losing custody and being forced to leave the country after divorce. Visitation rights under these circumstances are virtually non-existent unless the Saudi parent with custody voluntarily puts in the effort to make the arrangements”23.

Secondly, because Islam is genuinely mutual to all Saudi society, it became fundamental to the discursive construction of Saudi law and identity. For example, article 14 of the Naturalization statute requires an authorized certification from a government-appointed local-mosque Imam in which it declares the applicant to be a proper Muslim[24]. This rather explicit form of “Islamic” supervision confirms Michelle Foucault’s concept of domination through surveillance. In confirmation, Eleanor Doumato remarks that Islam was also infused extensively throughout the public-education curriculum, whose development “has been systematically enlisted in Saudi Arabia’s nation-building project at least since 1970,”[25] a period that was preceded by a sudden increase in the dependence on foreign labor. Clearly, in both legal practice and principle, and through government-appointed hegemonic institutions, Saudi nationals were subconsciously instructed to belief in the superiority of the government’s interpretation of Islam. In this view, non-nationals are seen as deficient Muslims, since they lack the government’s approval as they neither have significant access to public education, nor do they have the privilege to be naturalized[26].

Furthermore, as it adopted a traditional tribal structure, the kingdom had to implement a welfare system to comfort its citizens. Just as the tribal patriarch was expected to sustain the wellbeing of his tribal members by distributing available resources among them, so did the newly established kingdom. Although implementing a tribe-like structure secured the organizational composition of the kingdom, it, at the same time, re-inscribed “in society the values of patriarchal privilege”[27]. Because patriarchal economy wasn’t designed for a capitalist, efficiency-based market, such traditional Bedouin values proved to be futile. While tribal welfare was based on subsistence-level solidarity-based economy, Saudi standards of living became based on ownership of private property. Indeed, Saudi lifestyle, grew to be highly dependent on the state’s facilities rather than on personal qualities or achievements. Laurent Murawiec remarks that Saudis made no “effort to produce” because they believed that industrial work was reserved for inferiors, especially that “it requires conformity to rules and obedience to superiors who are not tribal [chiefs]”[28] Because the endurance of Saudis’ daily-life amenities was reliant on oil-income, oil became a fundamental part of Saudi identity. Additionally, the kingdom’s status as a welfare state demanded an institutionalization of public resources in such a way that citizenship became more than a legal identification or a means of communicating with the state. In fact, citizenship in Saudi Arabia had no political dimension to it, as the state was arranged based on an absolute monarchy. 

In this regard, and as the state manipulates the distribution of the oil wealth among its subjects, citizenship developed into a tool for social stratification rather than a framework of entitlements and responsibilities; an “exclusionary force”[29] that consolidates a group while repudiating another. Indeed, more than just to ease the regulations of foreigners, the sponsorship program, which diffused disciplinary power throughout Saudi society, played an important social function. Contrary to expectations, sponsorship, known as Kafalah, constituted more than just “a labor-contract through which an agreed amount of labor is performed and an agreed salary is paid”[30]. Instead, a foreigner’s career came to be entirely dependent on the satisfaction of a Saudi sponsor, who, in the case of disapproval, can end the worker’s residence permit30. What’s more, the statute of “transporting” sponsorship from one sponsor to another commodified foreigners into exchangeable properties with changing values. In light of this, sponsorship resembled a device that empowered the Saudis and promoted them to become, as Marx would put it, class-conscious. Thus, the introduction of sponsorship can be perceived as a modified form of subjugation, where the Saudi sponsor is a proprietor. However, the distinction between the proprietor and the subdued individual in such form of servitude is based solely on citizenship. In this regard, identifying as a Saudi became an exclusive privilege. In concurrence, Abjorn Eide says that citizenship in Saudi Arabia “had functioned as a criterion of social exclusion, by dividing the privileged participants from those who were mere subjects of duties”[31].

Moreover, Saudi status was further consolidated when naturalization laws became inactive, and naturalization was “only possible by a rare special dispensation issued by the government upon petition”[32]. In exceptional cases of naturalization, foreigners were “granted citizenship provided they continue serving in the profession for which they were permitted to naturalize”[33]. Moreover, labor laws in Saudi Arabia require that employment be granted to non-Gulf Arabs and non-Arabs only when there are no national candidates[34]. Unfortunately, such laws are further exploited to the extent that experienced foreigners are almost always paid less than their local counterparts. In addition, some “may be supervised by less experienced and better-paid workers simply”[35] on the basis of nationality. For example, based on a study from the High Commission for Riyadh Development, the mean wage was estimated to be “about US$35,300 for Saudi employees compared to US$5,400 for non-Saudi employees, amounting to an 84.7 per cent wage differential”35.

Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia became “the least absorbent state, coming close to an extreme at which immigrant-origin actors [were] not even incorporated enough to exercise marginal social power”[36]. Instead, they were institutionally marginalized. In particular, Longva’s conception of Saudi Arabia as a “civic ethnocracy,”17 positions the country in conflict with the current globalized view of humanity. Absjorn Eide concurs adding that Saudi Arabia’s ethno-nationalist outlook introduced “serious obstacles to the implementation of human rights”15.  Indeed, in November 2005, just when Saudi Arabia declared amendments to its naturalization statute, GCC[37] Secretary –General Abdul-Rahman AL-Attiya affirmed that International accords are urging the GCC states to absorb expatriates and to treat them justly by “giving them salaries equal to nationals and greater rights in the areas of education and health”[38].

Additionally, the kingdom’s recent enrollment in the World Trade Organization[39] demands not only conformity to global labor-rights but also efficient, high-skilled workers, who take pride of being expeditious; something which Saudi Arabia lacks as “its population has, to a great extent, not been accustomed to working for its income”[40]. Naturalization wouldn’t only satisfy such demands, but it would also get Saudis out of their comfort-zone. As they observe that high-ranking employment positions are being filled by naturalized non-natives, they would hopefully become more competitive. Most probably, the government anticipates that naturalizing qualified foreigners would, on the long-term, alter the “work-ethic” of local Saudis so that “low-prestige jobs currently held by foreigners” become absorbed by native Saudis[41].

Evidently, although it may have some historical roots, it is through the government’s hegemonic rhetoric and legal discourse that such a supremacist perspective became institutionalized. From the former discussion, it becomes obvious how law in Saudi Arabia developed in a specific historical context. By managing the affairs of its non-nationals, the Saudi state had reduced the autonomous scope of its most vital community members, and placed its inactive citizens in dominance. The situation in which Saudi citizens found themselves in, have compelled them to develop a sense of preeminence. In essence, all of that was done to engender self-consciousness of a constitutive Saudi nation.

Additionally, in many ways, the new naturalization policy seems to be a response to global pressures only, whether from the neo-capitalist economy, or human-rights NGO’s. However, it must be noted that re-authorizing naturalization can also be viewed in the context of “Saudization” of the workforce. For example, “Bestowing citizenship on expatriate physicians” [42], though an expedient measure, is one step more towards the kingdom’s self-reliance. Also, as Saudis begin to participate in the global economy, their family ties would dwindle. Gradually, the nuclear family structure would come to dominate; stimulating a more efficient work-ethic.

Although 70% of naturalization applications were rejected in early January 2007,[43] exactly a year after Labor Minister Ghazi Al-Gosaibi anticipated a quota on naturalization[44], many of the remaining 30% are subject to approval. In fact, four months later, the king himself issued a royal decree issuing the citizenship to a considerable number of qualified, high-skilled applicants[45]. In particular, on the same day of the issuing, Al-Gosaibi announced that job-seekers should keep in mind that their “Saudi identity alone would not be enough for them to get jobs”[46]. This ascertains that the government of Saudi Arabia is planning to experience major development in the near future. The degree of naturalization efforts expressed by the state still seems unpredictable.  To what extent would naturalization contribute to the overall development is something that will be more comprehensible in the future.

Bibliography

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11. Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 53
12. Fakkar, Galal. “Many Expats Forced to Send Kids Abroad for Studies”. Arab News. August 31, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=86210&d=31&m=8&y=2006
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16. Department of Civil Status. “The Executive List of the Naturalization System in Saudi Arabia”. http://www.ahwal.gov.sa/production/About/Nationalit/index.asp
17. Quilliam, Neil and Kamel, Maggie. “Modernizing Legitimacy: Saudi Strategies”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.2, No.2: Summer 2003. http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kamel.htm
18. Murawiec, Laurent. Princes of Darkness. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005
19. Joseph, Suad. “Soraya altorki: Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”. Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
20. Madhi, Salah T., and Barrientos, Armando. “Saudisation and employment in Saudi Arabia”. Career Development International. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003. pages 70-77. http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Articles/1370080202.html
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23. “70% of Naturalization Applications Rejected”. The Saudi Gazette. January 13, 2007. http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23392&Itemid=146
24. Abdul Ghafour, P. K. “Naturalization of All Expatriates Is Not Possible, Says Gosaibi”. Arab News. January 17, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=76362&d=17&m=1&y=2006
25. Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “King Grants Citizenship to Number of Applicants”. Arab News. May 5, 2007 http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=95829&d=5&m=5&y=2007
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[1]Central Department of Statistics. “Work Force Research for 2006”.

[2] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 49

[3] Long, David E. “A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia”. SAIS Review Vol. XXII, No 2: Summer-Fall 2002 page 212

[4] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983 page 669

[5] Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London: Routledge, 2005.page3

[6] Al-Rashed, Abdul Rahman. “Naturalization of Qualified Professionals”. Asharq Alawsat. May 5, 2007.

[7] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 224

[8] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page 6.

[9] Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London: Routledge, 2005.page3

[10] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 122

[11]Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 53

[12] Fakkar, Galal. “Many Expats Forced to Send Kids Abroad for Studies”. Arab News. August 31, 2006.

[13] General Adminstration of Passports “Short History”. http://www.gdp.gov.sa/

[14] Atiyyah, Hamid S. “The Sponsorship System and Infringements of the Rights of Foreign Workers in Gulf Countries”. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol. 3, No.4, 1990. page.270

[15] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 100

[16] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 180

[17] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[18] Long, David E. “A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia”. SAIS Review Vol. XXII, No 2: Summer-Fall 2002 page224

[19] “Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East”(p.219)

[20] Doumato, Eleanor A. “Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.1: 1992. page39

[21] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[22] Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia: Washington D.C. “The Basic Law of Governance”

[23] “‘Inter-National’ Marriages Rife With Obstacles, Fraud”. Arab News. September18, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=86727&d=18&m=9&y=2006

[24] Department of Civil Status. “The Executive List of the Naturalization System in Saudi Arabia”. http://www.ahwal.gov.sa/production/About/Nationalit/index.asp

[25] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 49

[26] Quilliam, Neil and Kamel, Maggie. “Modernising Legitimacy: Saudi Strategies”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.2, No.2: Summer 2003.

http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kamel.htm

[27] Doumato, Eleanor A. “Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.1: 1992. page39

[28] Murawiec, Laurent. Princes of Darkness. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. page.219

[29] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 33

[30] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[31] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 99

[32]Joseph, Suad. “Soraya altorki: Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”. Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

[33] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983. page 674

[34] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page8

[35] Madhi, Salah T., and Barrientos, Armando. “Saudisation and employment in Saudi Arabia”. Career Development International. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003. pages 70-77.

[36] Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 55

[37] Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman

Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page8.

[39] Aarts, Paul, and Nonneman, Gerd. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. London: Hurst &Company, 2005. page 86.

[40] Jerichow, Anders. Saudi Arabia: Outside Global Law and Order. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997. page24

[41] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page 13.

[42] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983 page 674

[43] “70% of Naturalization Applications Rejected”. The Saudi Gazette. January 13, 2007.

[44] Abdul Ghafour, P. K. “Naturalization of All Expatriates Is Not Possible, Says Gosaibi”. Arab News. January 17, 2006.

[45] Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “King Grants Citizenship to Number of Applicants”. Arab News. May 5, 2007

[46] Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “Saudization Not for Just Menial Jobs: Gosaibi”. Arab News. May 5, 2007