Institutionalized Hegemony: Saudi Identity through the Legal Discourse of Citizenship

Institutionalized Hegemony: 

Saudi Identity through the 

Legal Discourse of Citizenship

Mohammad Fuad AlJishi

According to the 2006 statistical study about the workforce in Saudi Arabia, which was conducted by the Central Department of Statistics, only 49% out of more than 8 million workers were Saudi citizens[1]. In Saudi Arabia, foreign workforce participates in all fields of industry and significantly contributes to the stability of the daily lives of millions of Saudis both socially and economically. In 2005, Saudi Arabia reopened its doors into accepting naturalization applications of foreigners. Under the pressures of globalization, Saudi Arabia had to appropriately absorb its massive population of non-nationals. Long-forgotten generations of immigrant workers have been residing in the kingdom, yet they have always maintained their own sphere, becoming socially segregated from the locals. In reality, the country was stratified into two identities: one of the nationals and one of the non-nationals.

Generally, law plays an instrumental role in creating identities and categorizing individuals as it constructs privileges to some, and advantages to others.  Bearing that in mind, this paper outlines the manner through which the Saudi government discursively constructed a hegemonic image that was articulated through the legal affairs of its citizens and resident-aliens. The paper reveals that the Saudi government’s successful methodology of inspiring a national common identity hinges upon a narrative in which economy, society and politics are all connected and conceptualized in imagined synchronism[2]. Specifically, I argue that the Saudi legal discourse of citizenship, infused into other laws that regulate the status of foreigners, such as naturalization, residency permits, and sponsorship programs, forged a common identity among its subjects; an identity that is not only deliberately outlined so as to exclude non-nationals, but also one that promotes the supremacy of Saudis. Further, in order to play a more active role in the current global economy, Saudi Arabia would have to adjust that identity; and one way to achieve such a change is through reviving its naturalization policy.

To begin with, the history of naturalization in Saudi Arabia goes back to the founding of the country in 1932. At that early phase, the inhabitants of the Middle East were still unfamiliar with the emerging borders that divided their vast land into separate states. Indeed, former CEO of Aramco Oil Company affirms that “when he first arrived in the kingdom in late 1937, virtually no persons considered themselves Saudis”[3]. With such impressions in mind, an influx of Arabs from neighboring territories arrived to the newly established kingdom. Many of them immigrated not only to escape the harsh conditions of colonial rule in their respective regions, but also to contribute to the building of the government and economy of the Saudi state. For the founders, not only such immigration was unobjectionable but it was necessary to the development of the state. Because Saudi Arabia experienced little Ottoman domination and no Western colonization, the country was not familiar with any modern system of administration[4]. Thus, the king made comprehensive efforts to indiscriminately recruit and naturalize any immigrant community. Madawi Al-Rasheed asserts that the king naturalized African, Indian, European and Persian communities[5]. Abdul-Rahman Al-Rashid remarks that “King Abdulaziz appointed non-Saudis as ambassadors, ministers and advisors” where “they offered great services to the young state at that early and crucial stage”[6]. However, with the advent of political contentions between Arab countries in the 1960’s, naturalization became rare[7]. Such halt of naturalization, took place on the advent of a Saudi economic boom, which, as Al-Rasheed remarks, ultimately consolidated the “distinctions between ‘insiders and outsiders’”.

During the politically volatile period of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the kingdom experienced several dissident movements, which, in many cases, were initiated by non-native Saudis[8]. As a result, the government was “eager to distribute lavish benefits to those who are defined as nationals” in an effort to avert the public from politics and gain the people’s loyalty[9]. Moreover, to support such a lavish lifestyle as well as a rapidly thriving economy, the government had to import millions of cheap foreign workers, particularly from South and Southeast Asia. Such sudden presence of a substantial foreign workforce in all levels of society threatened the so-called “Saudi cultural integrity,” and made the Saudis feel as though they were a minority[10]. In this context, the government was forced to take strong measures to restrain foreigners and differentiate them from nationals. For example, “only Saudi citizens had a right to higher education, property ownership, and permanent residence”[11]. Not being able to accommodate millions of non-Saudi children in public schools, the Saudi government introduced quotas that restrict the number of non-Saudis in public schools to 3-5% of the total school population[12]. As a result, 90% of expatriates were forced “to choose the more expensive option of sending their children to private schools”12. What’s more, in the early 1980’s, and in the process of separating the Passport Department from the Civil Status Department[13], the government reinforced its Internal Passport system, known as Iqama, which is a residential permit, by introducing a “sponsorship program,” which entitled a Saudi “sponsor” to dominate a “sponsored” foreign worker[14]. By 1992, and after the Gulf War crisis, the king Fahd issued a royal decree that delineated the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia.

In reference to such history, just as it originated in late 18^th century France[15], citizenship and residency regulations in the kingdom were introduced to minimize disruptions not only by aliens but also by internal divisions. For example, the sponsorship system was an effective vehicle through which people practiced their longing for power instead of being occupied by familial, tribal, or even political rivalries.

In fear of local diversity and in an effort to homogenize its subjects, the Saudi state attempted to define or rather construct ethnic commonalities by emphasizing religion, language, and genealogy. Specifically, the high selectivity of the kingdom’s “jus sanguinis conception of citizenship”36contributed to the gradual construction of a hegemonic paradigm of ethno-nationalism that, as Anh Longva states, revolves around an “imagined” [16], “natural and ethnically pure community”[17].

To begin with, although Arab speaking nations extend from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, certain nations tended to emphasize their Arab ancestry more than others; most distinguished of these is Saudi Arabia. As David Long corroborates “virtually all Saudis belong to an extended family”[18]. In fact, most identify with a specific tribe and “value blood-ties even more than money”18. In this regard, Saudis identify themselves in a collective manner rather on individual basis18. Thus, because indigenous Saudis appreciated kinship much more than statehood,[19] the Saudi state had to present itself in a manner that attaches statehood to every subject[20]. To accomplish this, the founding Al-Saud clan portrayed their kingdom as if it was a huge tribe inclusive of all Saudi citizens, “with the monarchy fulfilling the patriarchal obligations of the tribal sheik [i.e. leader]”20. Therefore, just as Saudi citizenship naturally emerged from such patrilineally “shared descent,”[21] so did the stringency of the naturalization process; the king had to preserve the honor of the kingdom just as the sheik used to guard the admission to his tribe20. Such a tribal paradigm evolved gradually culminating with the issuing of the Basic law in 1992.  Hence, it is no wonder that Articles 9 and 10, respectively, of Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law of Governance specifically declare that “the family is the nucleus of Saudi society,”[22] and that “the state shall aspire to promote family bonds”22.

Taking that in consideration, and as tribalism entails the necessity of keeping “the blood-lines pure”20, marriages between Saudis and non-nationals seemed inconceivable to the state, and thus invalid. Because marrying non-Saudi nationals was no longer tolerable, and naturalization was not an option, the only way that foreigners could legally live with their Saudi spouses was by applying for  a home-working visa, in which they were assigned a legal status of a ‘housekeeper’[23]. “Furthermore, custody disputes favor the Saudi parent and often rules in favor of men [emphasizing the state’s patriarchal values], putting non-Saudi women at greater risk of losing custody and being forced to leave the country after divorce. Visitation rights under these circumstances are virtually non-existent unless the Saudi parent with custody voluntarily puts in the effort to make the arrangements”23.

Secondly, because Islam is genuinely mutual to all Saudi society, it became fundamental to the discursive construction of Saudi law and identity. For example, article 14 of the Naturalization statute requires an authorized certification from a government-appointed local-mosque Imam in which it declares the applicant to be a proper Muslim[24]. This rather explicit form of “Islamic” supervision confirms Michelle Foucault’s concept of domination through surveillance. In confirmation, Eleanor Doumato remarks that Islam was also infused extensively throughout the public-education curriculum, whose development “has been systematically enlisted in Saudi Arabia’s nation-building project at least since 1970,”[25] a period that was preceded by a sudden increase in the dependence on foreign labor. Clearly, in both legal practice and principle, and through government-appointed hegemonic institutions, Saudi nationals were subconsciously instructed to belief in the superiority of the government’s interpretation of Islam. In this view, non-nationals are seen as deficient Muslims, since they lack the government’s approval as they neither have significant access to public education, nor do they have the privilege to be naturalized[26].

Furthermore, as it adopted a traditional tribal structure, the kingdom had to implement a welfare system to comfort its citizens. Just as the tribal patriarch was expected to sustain the wellbeing of his tribal members by distributing available resources among them, so did the newly established kingdom. Although implementing a tribe-like structure secured the organizational composition of the kingdom, it, at the same time, re-inscribed “in society the values of patriarchal privilege”[27]. Because patriarchal economy wasn’t designed for a capitalist, efficiency-based market, such traditional Bedouin values proved to be futile. While tribal welfare was based on subsistence-level solidarity-based economy, Saudi standards of living became based on ownership of private property. Indeed, Saudi lifestyle, grew to be highly dependent on the state’s facilities rather than on personal qualities or achievements. Laurent Murawiec remarks that Saudis made no “effort to produce” because they believed that industrial work was reserved for inferiors, especially that “it requires conformity to rules and obedience to superiors who are not tribal [chiefs]”[28] Because the endurance of Saudis’ daily-life amenities was reliant on oil-income, oil became a fundamental part of Saudi identity. Additionally, the kingdom’s status as a welfare state demanded an institutionalization of public resources in such a way that citizenship became more than a legal identification or a means of communicating with the state. In fact, citizenship in Saudi Arabia had no political dimension to it, as the state was arranged based on an absolute monarchy. 

In this regard, and as the state manipulates the distribution of the oil wealth among its subjects, citizenship developed into a tool for social stratification rather than a framework of entitlements and responsibilities; an “exclusionary force”[29] that consolidates a group while repudiating another. Indeed, more than just to ease the regulations of foreigners, the sponsorship program, which diffused disciplinary power throughout Saudi society, played an important social function. Contrary to expectations, sponsorship, known as Kafalah, constituted more than just “a labor-contract through which an agreed amount of labor is performed and an agreed salary is paid”[30]. Instead, a foreigner’s career came to be entirely dependent on the satisfaction of a Saudi sponsor, who, in the case of disapproval, can end the worker’s residence permit30. What’s more, the statute of “transporting” sponsorship from one sponsor to another commodified foreigners into exchangeable properties with changing values. In light of this, sponsorship resembled a device that empowered the Saudis and promoted them to become, as Marx would put it, class-conscious. Thus, the introduction of sponsorship can be perceived as a modified form of subjugation, where the Saudi sponsor is a proprietor. However, the distinction between the proprietor and the subdued individual in such form of servitude is based solely on citizenship. In this regard, identifying as a Saudi became an exclusive privilege. In concurrence, Abjorn Eide says that citizenship in Saudi Arabia “had functioned as a criterion of social exclusion, by dividing the privileged participants from those who were mere subjects of duties”[31].

Moreover, Saudi status was further consolidated when naturalization laws became inactive, and naturalization was “only possible by a rare special dispensation issued by the government upon petition”[32]. In exceptional cases of naturalization, foreigners were “granted citizenship provided they continue serving in the profession for which they were permitted to naturalize”[33]. Moreover, labor laws in Saudi Arabia require that employment be granted to non-Gulf Arabs and non-Arabs only when there are no national candidates[34]. Unfortunately, such laws are further exploited to the extent that experienced foreigners are almost always paid less than their local counterparts. In addition, some “may be supervised by less experienced and better-paid workers simply”[35] on the basis of nationality. For example, based on a study from the High Commission for Riyadh Development, the mean wage was estimated to be “about US$35,300 for Saudi employees compared to US$5,400 for non-Saudi employees, amounting to an 84.7 per cent wage differential”35.

Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia became “the least absorbent state, coming close to an extreme at which immigrant-origin actors [were] not even incorporated enough to exercise marginal social power”[36]. Instead, they were institutionally marginalized. In particular, Longva’s conception of Saudi Arabia as a “civic ethnocracy,”17 positions the country in conflict with the current globalized view of humanity. Absjorn Eide concurs adding that Saudi Arabia’s ethno-nationalist outlook introduced “serious obstacles to the implementation of human rights”15.  Indeed, in November 2005, just when Saudi Arabia declared amendments to its naturalization statute, GCC[37] Secretary –General Abdul-Rahman AL-Attiya affirmed that International accords are urging the GCC states to absorb expatriates and to treat them justly by “giving them salaries equal to nationals and greater rights in the areas of education and health”[38].

Additionally, the kingdom’s recent enrollment in the World Trade Organization[39] demands not only conformity to global labor-rights but also efficient, high-skilled workers, who take pride of being expeditious; something which Saudi Arabia lacks as “its population has, to a great extent, not been accustomed to working for its income”[40]. Naturalization wouldn’t only satisfy such demands, but it would also get Saudis out of their comfort-zone. As they observe that high-ranking employment positions are being filled by naturalized non-natives, they would hopefully become more competitive. Most probably, the government anticipates that naturalizing qualified foreigners would, on the long-term, alter the “work-ethic” of local Saudis so that “low-prestige jobs currently held by foreigners” become absorbed by native Saudis[41].

Evidently, although it may have some historical roots, it is through the government’s hegemonic rhetoric and legal discourse that such a supremacist perspective became institutionalized. From the former discussion, it becomes obvious how law in Saudi Arabia developed in a specific historical context. By managing the affairs of its non-nationals, the Saudi state had reduced the autonomous scope of its most vital community members, and placed its inactive citizens in dominance. The situation in which Saudi citizens found themselves in, have compelled them to develop a sense of preeminence. In essence, all of that was done to engender self-consciousness of a constitutive Saudi nation.

Additionally, in many ways, the new naturalization policy seems to be a response to global pressures only, whether from the neo-capitalist economy, or human-rights NGO’s. However, it must be noted that re-authorizing naturalization can also be viewed in the context of “Saudization” of the workforce. For example, “Bestowing citizenship on expatriate physicians” [42], though an expedient measure, is one step more towards the kingdom’s self-reliance. Also, as Saudis begin to participate in the global economy, their family ties would dwindle. Gradually, the nuclear family structure would come to dominate; stimulating a more efficient work-ethic.

Although 70% of naturalization applications were rejected in early January 2007,[43] exactly a year after Labor Minister Ghazi Al-Gosaibi anticipated a quota on naturalization[44], many of the remaining 30% are subject to approval. In fact, four months later, the king himself issued a royal decree issuing the citizenship to a considerable number of qualified, high-skilled applicants[45]. In particular, on the same day of the issuing, Al-Gosaibi announced that job-seekers should keep in mind that their “Saudi identity alone would not be enough for them to get jobs”[46]. This ascertains that the government of Saudi Arabia is planning to experience major development in the near future. The degree of naturalization efforts expressed by the state still seems unpredictable.  To what extent would naturalization contribute to the overall development is something that will be more comprehensible in the future.

Bibliography

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12. Fakkar, Galal. “Many Expats Forced to Send Kids Abroad for Studies”. Arab News. August 31, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=86210&d=31&m=8&y=2006
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18. Murawiec, Laurent. Princes of Darkness. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005
19. Joseph, Suad. “Soraya altorki: Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”. Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
20. Madhi, Salah T., and Barrientos, Armando. “Saudisation and employment in Saudi Arabia”. Career Development International. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003. pages 70-77. http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Articles/1370080202.html
21. Aarts, Paul, and Nonneman, Gerd. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. London: Hurst &Company, 2005. page 86.
22. Jerichow, Anders. Saudi Arabia: Outside Global Law and Order. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997. page24
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24. Abdul Ghafour, P. K. “Naturalization of All Expatriates Is Not Possible, Says Gosaibi”. Arab News. January 17, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=76362&d=17&m=1&y=2006
25. Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “King Grants Citizenship to Number of Applicants”. Arab News. May 5, 2007 http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=95829&d=5&m=5&y=2007
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[1]Central Department of Statistics. “Work Force Research for 2006”.

[2] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 49

[3] Long, David E. “A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia”. SAIS Review Vol. XXII, No 2: Summer-Fall 2002 page 212

[4] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983 page 669

[5] Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London: Routledge, 2005.page3

[6] Al-Rashed, Abdul Rahman. “Naturalization of Qualified Professionals”. Asharq Alawsat. May 5, 2007.

[7] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 224

[8] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page 6.

[9] Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London: Routledge, 2005.page3

[10] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 122

[11]Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 53

[12] Fakkar, Galal. “Many Expats Forced to Send Kids Abroad for Studies”. Arab News. August 31, 2006.

[13] General Adminstration of Passports “Short History”. http://www.gdp.gov.sa/

[14] Atiyyah, Hamid S. “The Sponsorship System and Infringements of the Rights of Foreign Workers in Gulf Countries”. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol. 3, No.4, 1990. page.270

[15] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 100

[16] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 180

[17] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[18] Long, David E. “A Dialogue: Saudi Arabia”. SAIS Review Vol. XXII, No 2: Summer-Fall 2002 page224

[19] “Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East”(p.219)

[20] Doumato, Eleanor A. “Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.1: 1992. page39

[21] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[22] Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia: Washington D.C. “The Basic Law of Governance”

[23] “‘Inter-National’ Marriages Rife With Obstacles, Fraud”. Arab News. September18, 2006. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=86727&d=18&m=9&y=2006

[24] Department of Civil Status. “The Executive List of the Naturalization System in Saudi Arabia”. http://www.ahwal.gov.sa/production/About/Nationalit/index.asp

[25] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 49

[26] Quilliam, Neil and Kamel, Maggie. “Modernising Legitimacy: Saudi Strategies”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. Vol.2, No.2: Summer 2003.

http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kamel.htm

[27] Doumato, Eleanor A. “Gender, Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.1: 1992. page39

[28] Murawiec, Laurent. Princes of Darkness. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. page.219

[29] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 33

[30] Dresch, Paul, and Piscatori, James. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. page 119

[31] Butenschon, Davis, and Hassassian. Citizenship and the State in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. page 99

[32]Joseph, Suad. “Soraya altorki: Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”. Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

[33] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983. page 674

[34] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page8

[35] Madhi, Salah T., and Barrientos, Armando. “Saudisation and employment in Saudi Arabia”. Career Development International. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003. pages 70-77.

[36] Koslowski, Rey. International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New York: Routledge, 2005. page 55

[37] Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman

Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page8.

[39] Aarts, Paul, and Nonneman, Gerd. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. London: Hurst &Company, 2005. page 86.

[40] Jerichow, Anders. Saudi Arabia: Outside Global Law and Order. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997. page24

[41] Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab Versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries”.  United Nations Expert Group Meeting On International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. page 13.

[42] Searle, Maureen C. and Gallagher, Eugene B. “Manpower Issues in Saudi Health Development”. The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society, Vol. 61, No.4.: Autumn, 1983 page 674

[43] “70% of Naturalization Applications Rejected”. The Saudi Gazette. January 13, 2007.

[44] Abdul Ghafour, P. K. “Naturalization of All Expatriates Is Not Possible, Says Gosaibi”. Arab News. January 17, 2006.

[45] Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “King Grants Citizenship to Number of Applicants”. Arab News. May 5, 2007

[46] Abdul Ghafour, P.K. “Saudization Not for Just Menial Jobs: Gosaibi”. Arab News. May 5, 2007

Divinity, Heroism, and Construction of Identity:

A comparative study of the Epic of Gilgamesh and the Book of Exodus

Mohammad Fuad AlJishi

Ian Assmann asserts that “the past is modeled, invented, reinvented, and reconstructed by the present.”[1] In this perspective, developing a distinctive cultural identity necessitates the emergence of a coherent narrative that can recount and assimilate the past in light of the present reality. These narratives employ culture-specific elements such as divinities, and heroic figures so as to develop a national common identity. The goal of these literary pieces, as Assmann mentioned, makes their composition process inherently selective, if not innovative, as historical accuracy becomes irrelevant. Indeed, the authors resort to emphasize the relationships between humanity and the divine realm.  In particular, because of their prominent and mysterious nature, the involvement of the gods accentuates the literary text and elevates its status. Moreover, the interaction between the gods and humans is heavily facilitated by the introduction of heroic figures. Deemed to be exemplars that represent certain values, the protagonists emerge to symbolize the civilization as a whole. Their distinctive status allows them to interact with the divine and gain “exclusive knowledge,” which symbolizes divine blessings over the entire nation. In addition, the narrative also addresses the situation in which the gods abandon that civilization. In other words, the narrative essentially promotes national consciousness by appreciating the presence of the divine.

In this context, the Epic of Gilgamesh and the Book of Exodus emerge as literary masterpieces that celebrate civilization through communication with the divine. Both Moses and Gilgamesh brought order and introduced traditions of governing human society by acquiring divine wisdom from the gods. Both protagonists are perceived as the founders of their corresponding civilization. In other words, the two classic works, each in its particular context, highlight selective and refined sequence of events, which articulate efforts to establish an identity. Through the introduction of heroic figures that communicate with the divine realm, the authors of the two literary texts incorporate narratives of the past to present an ideal model that confirms a common identity and commemorates their particular culture and civilization.

To begin with, a comprehensive analysis of the two ancient texts entails identifying the period of time as well as the audience to whom the texts were written to. Becoming familiar with the location and surroundings of the authors of the texts enhances our understanding of the didactic narratives and the particular values associated with each of them. The time at which each text was finally composed influences the choice of which themes to emphasize and which ones to undermine.  Particularly, in each case, certain percussive events, which take place during the life of the authors, trigger them to account for their present time by reflecting on the past. For instance, scholars agree that the Torah didn’t take its final shape until the sixth century BC, after the destruction of the first Temple in Jerusalem and the exile of the Israelites to Babylon[2]. At that period of time, the Jewish community perceived the event as a punishment from God for the abandonment of the Israelites to the true teachings of Moses, and their abuse of the privileges given to them by God. Such discomfort with human nature and power emerges consistently throughout the narrative, as the biblical author tries to diminish the role of human beings. Even more, the many explicit commandments to “remember the time of slavery and exodus out of Egypt”, seem more reasonable when discussed in light of the exilic period. In fact, the theme of remembering fits coherently with the aspiration of the Biblical redactors, which is to remind their community of their distinguished status and commitment to a god they have forsaken.

Similarly, the Epic of Gilgamesh also engages a theme of memory. Though not as explicit as in the bible, which commands people to remember specific events and make these events a point of reference, the Epic too constantly refers back to the event of the Deluge and the antediluvian era, as if that event functions as a point of reference. In contrast to the biblical redactors, the authors of the Epic of Gilgamesh seek to emphasize human potential and the vast possibilities which heroes and human beings can accomplish. This emphasis reflects the time at which the epic was redacted or the people who it was written to. Most probably, the Epic was redacted at a time of triumph and power. Indeed, as Thorkild Jacobsen corroborates, the most complete set of tablets, on which the current Epic is based upon, were written in Akkadian language at about 1600 B.C, during the rise of Babylonian hegemony over the whole of Mesopotamia[3]. This period constitutes a period of peace and stability, something which barely happens in Mesopotamia because of the constant presence of competing powers.  What’s more, this period also constitutes the height of Mesopotamian culture. The Old Babylonian power unified the region and absorbed different cultures and attempted to infuse them together. Also, that period of time corresponds to the emergence of the code of Hammurabi, the first legislative text in Mesopotamia. Moreover, the Epic of Gilgamesh encompasses a number of separate prominent folktales which circulated Mesopotamia[4]. In fact, Andrew George asserts that “the Old Babylonian texts bear witness to a wholesale revision of Gilgamesh material to form a connected story.”[5] By incorporating different ancient folktales into one single text, the authors of the epic of Gilgamesh attempts to unify Mesopotamian diverse civilization into a culture with a cohesive identity[6]. In fact, the epic protagonist, Gilgamesh, symbolizes such unity, as he represents universal kingship mandated by the gods. Even more so, the epic can be seen as a celebration of the achievements of Mesopotamian civilization during the Babylonian period. For instance, as Jacobsen indicates, the episode of the “coming of Enkidu” is absent from the Sumerian prototype of the epic[7].In fact, “the arrival of Enkidu” was probably included in the Babylonian version, because the new Empire wanted to contrast the advancement of Mesopotamian culture with that of the primitiveness of those outside of civilization, especially now that it’s united under one rule. In his journey to Uruk, Enkidu is said to have grown up and that “his understanding broadened” once he entered the Mesopotamian cultural sphere. In other words, the Epic of Gilgamesh can be viewed as a national epic that reflects Mesopotamian culture. The many detailed descriptions of specific events, occasions, and cultural customs such as orphan places, worship style, economic activity, reveal the implicit nationalistic nature of the text.

Similarly, the Exodus narrative becomes the central event in Jewish culture[8]. By attributing rituals and relating traditional practices to the Exodus sequence of events, Jewish culture defines Exodus as the point of reference which the civilization identifies itself by. In fact, the author of the Book of Exodus, even in the beginning of the event, commands the Israelites to “remember this day in which ye came out from Egypt.”[9] In addition, the redactors deliberately dedicated more than half of the Book of Exodus to legislative teachings that are specific to the Israelite community. Such emphasis enhances not only the collective identity of the people, but also the commitment of the people to the exodus narrative. In other words, unlike the people of Mesopotamia, the Israelites during the exilic period didn’t have any independent state that would implement a common identity among them. During that period, the only memory of a national identity stemmed from the legislative literature, especially of that mentioned in the Book of Exodus. Most importantly, the detailed descriptions of the Mt. Sinai covenant and the construction of the Tabernacle illustrate the selectivity of the biblical redactor in emphasizing codes of law rather than historical accounts. Such selectivity doesn’t only deemphasize the heroic character of Moses, but also sheds light on the redemptive aspects of the narrative, which again serve the redactor’s purposes[10]. In particular, although the calf crisis separates itself as one of the more significant events that would later shape the nature of the relationship between God and the His people, the focus in the Book of Exodus is more on the redemptive components; namely, the construction of the Tabernacle. What’s more, not only does the meticulous construction of the Tabernacle represent the collective struggle of the tribe of Israel to redeem itself from its great sin, but it also symbolizes the formation of an identity and, on top of all, the eventual construction of the kingdom of Israel. In this regard, the construction of the Tabernacle is analogous to Gilgamesh’s construction of the walls of Uruk. Akin to the Tabernacle, the walls of the Uruk represent the “redemption” of Gilgamesh from his defiance to the gods and his quest for immortality. Evidently, the process of construction of identity is central to both ancient texts.

Despite their divergence in the storyline, the two ancient texts serve similar objectives. Unlike the tribe of Israel, the story of Gilgamesh takes place in a civilized urban culture. Therefore, the construction of the walls contributes not only to the separation of the enclosed people from their outer counterparts but also to the preeminent attitude of the inhabitants of the city, which in this case symbolizes Mesopotamia as a whole. In addition, Gilgamesh is said to have restored the original walls of the city of Uruk, which have existed during the antediluvian period: he “who restored the cult centers destroyed by the Deluge, and set in place for the people the rites of the cosmos.”[11] In this case, and similar to the slavery narrative in Exodus, the Mesopotamian civilization defines itself by the event of the Deluge, which functions as the pivotal point of reference. As indicated in the Sumerian King List, Mesopotamian ideology entails the belief that “kinship was lowered from heaven.”[12] This tradition is claimed to have been consistently followed in periods both before and after the Deluge. Indeed, the Epic of Gilgamesh narrates that it was Gilgamesh himself who restored the walls to their “primordial foundations”, and thus re-established the relationship between humans and the gods. Actually, Gilgamesh’s action is a reminiscence of the original antediluvian model, which Mesopotamians believed to be the best approach to governing human society[13].

Furthermore, in each literary work, both Moses and Gilgamesh emerge as remarkable heroes who figuratively built the foundations of the identity of their corresponding society. By claiming the ancient existence of their identity, as in Gilgamesh, or by tracing its roots back in history, as in Exodus, each protagonist employs a chronological narrative in an effort to rationalize the emergent identity which they endeavor to establish. However, the two figures are portrayed differently. In contrast to the focus on the individual struggle in the Epic of Gilgamesh, the Exodus narrative puts a greater emphasis on the collective struggle of the people of Israel than on that of Moses. Such variations mirror the differences between the structures of each of the two cultures. Namely, the audience which the Epic of Gilgamesh is written for constitutes a far more diverse and less united people than that of the Book of Exodus. Emphasizing the people in a Mesopotamian epic would be very challenging given the complex diversity of the people. Thus, the author introduced a Mesopotamian hero to create a national culture and overlook such diversity. On the other hand, the biblical redactor had to emphasize the uniqueness of the people of Israel as a whole as it was the most evident methodology of enforcing a separate identity. The introduction of a hero was not as necessary for serving the didactic purposes in the Bible, as it was in the Epic of Gilgamesh. Still, the role of Moses is central to the Exodus narrative. Influenced by the events of his time, the biblical redactor consistently expresses his discomfort in human power. Specifically, due to Moses’ heroic qualities, the biblical redactor is cautious not consolidate the didactic values in the Exodus narrative to the character of a single human-being. Moreover, Moses heroic nature is manifested in his involvement with the introduction of monotheism, the liberation and the nationalization of his people, and the legislative literature which he introduced to his people. Moreover, similar to Gilgamesh, Moses too is deemed to represent his people as a whole. For example, the Golden calf incident takes place during Moses sudden absence.  Apparently, the absence of “Moses” dismantles a nation, as if Moses is the source for the strength of the community. What’s more, Moses’ outsider stance in the Bible can be seen to reflect the fate of the community that he is building.

In addition, both texts narrate the story of each protagonist as if heroism “occurs only after a long history of heroic misdemeanors.”[14]On one hand, events in Gilgamesh’s early life expose his tyrannical attributes, which are climaxed by the murder of the guardian of the cedar forest, Humbaba, and the Bull of Heaven. On the other hand, despite his later piety, Moses has a history of murder, too. In this case, the characters’ misbehavior is introduced to indicate the remarkable “personal growth” that each individual had to go through before achieving their heroic status. Again, the notion of personal growth figuratively represents the rather destined progress of a civilization as a whole. Besides, those negative incidents have had positive implications because they induced the characters to reflect on their actions, and thereby, the characters became more contemplative and wise. Despite the differences in the scheme of the narratives, the authors deliberately incorporate heroic elements to strengthen the instructiveness of each literary text.

Moreover, in addition to heroic leaders, such identity construction process requires narratives that contain elements of culture-specific divinities. Specifically, Gilgamesh re-appropriates the relationship of the gods with the people so that civilization can flourish once again, while Moses brings down laws and rules which the Israelites have to adhere with so that God can fulfill his covenant with them and enhance their prosperity and peaceful existence. In light of that, the introduction of heroic figures provides a medium through which humanity can communicate with the divine realm. In fact, one of the main features that distinguish the protagonists of each text is their reception of wisdom. In this regard, Andrew George asserts that “the wisdom [Gilgamesh] brought back from his journey was more than personal knowledge,” as it is said in the Epic that he “saw the Deep, the country’s foundation”[15].  In fact it was this profound, mysterious and divine knowledge which allows Gilgamesh to play “a key role in restoring the antediluvian order after the Flood, particularly in restoring the cults of the gods to their proper glory”:

 The rites of Sumer, forgotten there since distant days of old…

[After the] Deluge it was you made known all the tasks of the land.”[16]

Likewise, Moses greatness in Exodus is only due to his ability to converse with God: “And the lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend.”[17] In both texts, it seems that divinities “took a personal interest in the affairs” of men of prowess[18] (page xxxi). For example, Moses is the only man among the Israelites who is conversant in Egyptian culture since he was raised as an Egyptian. Similarly, in addition to being a son of a goddess and belonging to an elite class, Gilgamesh excels in defeating the strongest of all men. Such interest in men with great aptitude probably suggests that the divinities are concerned with the extent of the ambitions of these men. In fact, the Exodus narrative expresses the extreme discomfort of the God of Israel with any person, such as Pharaoh, or even objects that call for the attention of people. Taking that into consideration, the Exodus narrative enforces a definitive separation between the divine and the human race. Although such fundamental disconnection doesn’t exist in Mesopotamian religion, the Epic of Gilgamesh eventually establishes and demonstrates a distinction that resembles the one present in the Bible. In particular, at the end of his journey and before his return to the city of Uruk, Gilgamesh realizes “his place in the divinely ordained scheme of things.”[19] In fact the epic, the Epic’s conclusion denotes that Gilgamesh’s ultimate wisdom is due to his recognition of the true position of humans determined by the gods. More importantly, the two ancient texts express the profound, if not absolute, authority that divinities have over the identity and the survival of a civilization.

In particular, the notion that people’s actions must conform to the divinities’ desires to maintain harmony and peace constitutes the central theme of both literary works. Specifically, in the Epic of Gilgamesh, one of the major incidents that induced Gilgamesh to journey the land seeking immortality was the death of Enkidu, which was the result of his abuse of power and interference with the will of the gods by murdering the guardian of the cedar forests, who was assigned by the god Enlil. “A similar disregard for the divine powers characterizes the next episode, in which Gilgamesh repudiates the goddess Ishtar with gratuitous insults and then fights and kills the celestial bull she hopes will avenge her. The gods, driven to act by the repeated violation of their order, doom Enkidu to die young and without a family, in fulfillment of Humbaba’s dying curse”[20] On the other hand, the narrative in the first twelve chapters of the Book of Exodus surrounds the antagonist: Pharaoh. In this case, Pharaoh is depicted as an individual with great prowess who arrogantly rejects the god of Israel.  By triggering the fury of God, Pharaoh as well as his Egyptian civilization become under the threat of annihilation because of the great plagues that the god of Israel struck them with. Similarly, the creation and worship of the Israelites of the golden calf presents a betrayal of the covenant between the people and their god. As a result, the Israelites experience God’s wrath because of their disobedience.

Despite the above common characteristics, and reminiscent of the heroic representation, the nature of divinity reflects the identity of each text’s audience. Specifically, divinities constitute mirror images of the structure of each society. Since the two epics fulfill didactic purposes of identity formation, each of them makes every effort to achieve such goal. For instance, in the case of the Israelites, the easiest and most comprehensible technique to unite them is to bring them under one god. However, in the case of Gilgamesh, the inherent diverse nature of the Mesopotamian people forces the existence of many gods. Still, the different gods are considered to be connected to one another by levels of kinship, so as to present them as a coherent family. Particularly, each Mesopotamian city centers itself around a temple, which is dedicated to specific gods. In fact, at the end of the Epic, Gilgamesh substantiates the presence of the temples and the practice of rituals. In comparison, the Book of Exodus concludes with construction of the Tabernacle, which is placed in the center of the community. Symbolizing the dwelling of the god of Israel in the Tabernacle, the cloud, which had appeared repeatedly far from the community, settles now in the middle of the camp right on top of the Tabernacle, symbolizing God’s redemption and deliverance of the people[21].

Evidently, the texts set the first encounters between humans and the divine as points of reference. These encounters can be viewed as covenants between humanity and the divine so as to confirm the humbleness of man. Later that point of reference becomes an integral part of the developing identity of that particular civilization. The point of reference becomes a narrative that involves heroes, conflicts and, on top of all, divinities. What is claimed to be a present phenomenon is traced to the past, a past which is connected to the presence through a journey that is guided by divine providence. In particular, the two ancient texts reflect extensive divine involvement within human history and earthly life. In the Epic of Gilgamesh, most of the characters involved are either gods or demi-gods. Likewise, in the Book of Exodus, the claimed author of the bible is God and the central figures are also of sacred nature such as Moses and Aaron. Furthermore, based on Exodus narrative, the Israelites are able to build a nation. Additionally, based on Gilgamesh’s realization of the significance of the gods and how they’re ultimately two separate worlds, the antediluvian era is restored and civilization can flourish again. In essence, by writing down those stories, and producing idealized versions of history, they didn’t only determine or help shape the identity of their corresponding societies, but they also determined what their civilizations will be remembered by.

Works Cited

1. Assmann, Ian. Moses the Egyptian: the Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. London: Harvard University Press, 1997.
2. Collins, John J. Introduction to the Hebrew Bible. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
3. Jacobsen, Thorkild. The Treasures of Darkness London: Yale University Press, 1976.
4. George, Andrew. The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. New York: Penguin Classics, 2003.
5. Nahum M. Sarna, Exploring Exodus: the Origins of Biblical Israel.New York: Schocken Books.
6. Texts from the Beginnings to the First Dynasty of Babylon, Historiographic Documents: The Sumerian King List. c. 2100 BC

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[1]Ian Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: the Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. (London: Harvard University Press, 1997) 9.

[2]John J Collins, Introduction to the Hebrew Bible. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press) 13.

[3] Thorkild Jacobsen, The Treasures of Darkness (London: Yale University Press, 1976) 195.

[4] Thorkild Jacobsen, The Treasures of Darkness (London: Yale University Press, 1976) 210.

[5] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xxi.

[6]  Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xvi-xvii.

[7] Thorkild Jacobsen, The Treasures of Darkness (London: Yale University Press, 1976) 214.

[8] Nahum M. Sarna,  Exploring Exodus: the Origins of Biblical Israel. (New York: Schocken Books) 3.

[9] The King James Holy Bible. (Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1978) Ex 13: 3.

[10] Nahum M. Sarna,  Exploring Exodus: the Origins of Biblical Israel. (New York: Schocken Books) 3.

[11] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xlviii.

[12] Texts from the Beginnings to the First Dynasty of Babylon, Historiographic Documents: The Sumerian King List. (c. 2100 BC)

[13] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xlix.

[14] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xlvi.

[15] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xlvi.

[16] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) L.

[17] The King James Holy Bible. (Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1978) Ex 33:11.

[18] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xxxi.

[19] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xlvi.

[20] Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh: the Babylonian Epic Poem and other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003) xlvii.

[21] The King James Holy Bible. (Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1978) Ex 40:34-38.