Critical Review of R. M. Schwartz book "The Curse of Cain"

Though written by me, the below text doesn't reflect my personal opinion and belief, but should be perceived  only as a critical assessment of Regina M. Schwartz's book: 
The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (1997), a study of identity and violence in the Hebrew Bible, which was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize.

Monotheism: a Paradoxical Path

Although it’s individuals who compose the larger society, it’s the memory of the society that stands to be most influential. In his book, Schwartz asserts that such a concept of “collective memory” along with our ancient biblical tradition have resulted in most our perceptions of the world. Certainly, the scriptualization of historic events affirms the role of cultural memory. Specifically, Schwartz argues that Biblical scriptures have had distinctive negative influences over our society which wouldn’t have taken place if those traditions didn’t emerge. Even though the writer makes use of ancient examples to further analyze the text and establish his point he fails to recognize that his argument includes all religions instead being exclusively targeting monotheistic traditions. Still, Schwartz intelligently underlines the features that characterize monotheism from other systems of belief.

To begin with, throughout the first part of his book, and by using certain examples, Schwartz asserts that violence in the name of religion has existed prior to the emergence of monotheism. However, the author ignores that fact, and throughout his biblical analysis he makes the claim that monotheism is inherently more violent than other religions. For example, after introducing the concept of the “other” and how it’s constructed in the Biblical tradition, Schwartz remarks that “if there were no identity shortage, if Israelites could be Egyptians too, for instance, there would be no need for aggressive or defensive gestures to protect their space” (p. 20). Actually, this indicates that identity formation or “nationalism” or even ethnocentrism have preceded the coming of monotheistic tradition. Again, a fact that Schwartz doesn’t emphasize. What’s more, Schwartz comments that the structural basis and details of the biblical covenant between God and the Israelites resembles that of most ancient near-eastern traditions. The concept of the “imbalance of power[s]”, as Schwartz puts it, was the driving force for any political ideology in the ancient near-east. For instance, the political scheme of Egypt was based on the disproportionate distribution of wealth and resources. In other words, the Egyptian Pharaoh had to control the allocation of resources in order to affirm his absolute power on the state. To legitimize such authority the Pharaohs had to employ an ideology that would facilitate his rule, to the Pharaohs, as to most politicians, religion is the key ideology that has a higher probability of a lasting and profound influence on masses.

Furthermore, even when Schwartz analyzes the concept of “God-given” identity of the Israelites, he fails to acknowledge that both the Sumerians kings and the Egyptian pharaohs asserted such claims. For example, in ancient Egyptian mythology, the pharaoh symbolized Egypt itself. The well-being of Egypt is assured by the safety and honor of the Egyptian pharaoh. What’s more, the pharaoh claimed that he himself functions as a mediator between this world and the heavenly gods. The mummy-cult in Egypt is due to the fact that Egyptian religion believed in the immortality of the pharaoh. Specifically, just as the identity of Egypt was in the Pharaoh, the identity of Israel in their God: “you’re my own people, my very own” (p. 18). Here, we see that the manner in which the God of Israel addresses and introduces himself in the Bible is similar to that of the Pharaoh to the people of Egypt. Both of them communicate and assert their identity on similar basis.

Moreover, it’s indeed true, especially in our current events, that monotheism, as Schwartz puts it, have “left a troubling legacy of the belief in land entitlement” (p. 42). However, Schwartz misses the fact that even though monotheism emphasized such a legacy, it didn’t create the concept itself. It’s not only the bible or monotheism which introduces to us the first model of nationalism. The construction of the other preceded the emergence of monotheism. Ancient civilizations, such as Egypt and Mesopotamia (the first on earth) have used religion in the same authoritative manner. Indeed, it’s very true that our modern perception of identity and nationalism ore our definitions of “who’s the ‘other’” is heavily influenced by Biblical traditions and content. However, that doesn’t mean that had monotheism didn’t emerge that our current perceptions would change dramatically. Certainly, our designation of self-identity and who’s the ‘other’ would be different. Yet, the concept of nationalism would still exist in one form or another.

In addition, the argument of the translatory nature of polytheism requires further examination. In this context, translatory means the ability to trace the same god, for example of fire or sun, among different religions, though named differently. The translatory gods are often manipulated by the rulers who enforced them to assure their particular sovereignty. Particularly, competing kings would associate their kingdoms with a particular set of Gods against the other set of gods which their enemy has identified with. Hence, isolating monotheism and confining the argument to it neglects historical reality. In fact, it’s not only monotheism that enforces identity and the construction of the other. It has been historically proven that, since the beginning of civilization, religion, in general, was initiated to enforce a common identity among its adherents that would differentiate them from others.

Although Schwartz’s argument over-emphasizes the role of monotheism in establishing hatred and violence, he still identifies the exclusive features that distinguish the monotheistic tradition from any other system of beliefs. In fact, Schwartz most successful argument is the “Universalism vs. Particularism”.  To explain, religion in general isn’t inherently violent. The existence of different gods or none, although can and have been abused throughout history, doesn’t implicitly suggest animosity or hatred. However, religion does become a breed of hatred when a god or a religious system defines itself upon the rejection of other gods and denies their very existence. Particularly, Schwartz argues that the first case represents a universal perspective that facilitates coexistence while maintaining individuality. Indeed, this is why he refers to polytheism as “cosmo-theism”. In fact, religious tolerance is rather feasible in the midst of the first case. On the other hand, the monotheistic traditions produce more violence, as Schwartz claims, because hostility to the "other” is fundamental to the construction of their identity. For example, Egypt is the defining entity on which the identity of Israel is built opposed to. In fact, the redactors of the bible have repeatedly employed the “normative inversion” narrative in composing the biblical literature, in which you remember what you oppose in order to remember yourself. Such usage of the “normative inversion” narrative is celebrated in the most critical theme of monotheistic literature. In the Ten Commandments Egypt appears again twice; once explicitly in the first and then implicitly in the second of the commandments.

In theory, Schwartz’s claims constitute a logical argument. Yet, historical preview of the pre-20^th century proves that monotheistic age (represented by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) is no more violent than the “Cosmo-theistic” age that preceded it, if not less violent. However, Schwartz “Universalism vs. Particularism”” argument applies most distinctively to our current reality. In no other previous times, have monotheism threatened the survival of humanity on earth than it does now. Conversely, polytheistic religious traditions have contributed negligible harm or hostility, if any, to the world. In this context, Schwartz’s exclusive attack on monotheism proves to be successful and most applicable to recent history.

In this context, the opposition of other gods or religions in monotheistic traditions entitles not only hostility but rather a feeling of being threatened. Because of such opposition, monotheism has always depicted its origins in the form of “escaping threats.” Here, the idea of a culture or a religion “set a part” from their environment, is heavily inspired by the storyline of the heroic figures of these religions. For example, all the leaders of monotheistic faiths, including Muhammad, Bahaullah, Jesus, Moses and even Abraham, are exemplars of the concept of a “man a part.” In other words, all these leaders posses a foreign element to the people who they’re leading and all of them are in the end rejected. The most prominent one of these is Moses. Although Moses is the hero and the establisher of Israel, he is constantly reminded by the fact that his wife in not an Israelite. In fact, Moses himself didn’t grow to be an Israelite; he was an Egyptian. Additionally, throughout the Torah Moses is heavily portrayed as constantly feeling threatened, and in the end he’s not even buried with his people. The fact that Moses’ grave was never known to the Israelites reflects the paradox of monotheism. In other words, Moses life-story constitutes nothing but a mirror image of Israel, and, thereby, monotheism. Specifically, the people of Israel were, just as Moses was, in constant threat from the surroundings which they oppose. In fact, Moses death as a stranger within his people can be reflected in the Israelite own fate: being strangers in their own land.

Additionally, Schwartz extends his argument and pursues a philosophical approach to elucidate the trouble with monotheistic traditions. He explains that our current concept of scarcity that is inherent at every level in our human societies originates with the emergence of the biblical tradition. The paradoxes of exodus, conquest, land and kinship all represent elements of the “insufficiency” of life. In particular, Schwartz argues that our perceptions of the world would be vastly different had we adopted a philosophy of “abundance” rather than “scarcity”.

In essence, modern society, even in secular terms, has been immensely inspired by biblical monotheism. In this manner, one must be careful to distinguish “monotheism” from “Abrahamic monotheism”.  Although most people are familiar with the latter only, monotheism has preceded the existence of Israel. Akhenaton, the Egyptian pharaoh who ruled about 1450 BCE, was the first to initiate and establish a monotheistic religion with only one god and its name was Aton: the god of light. Although Akhenaton started such tradition, his failure to properly employ a “normative inversion” allowed his religion to completely collapse after his death. Although he’s a historical figure, whose existence is substantiated by archaeological evidence unlike that of Moses, Akhenaton didn’t refute his one God against the other gods but he was rather “silent” about them. Conversely, Moses, a solely mythical figure, established himself as a heroic figure that persistently appears as a figure of memory. Such heroic nature is manifested in his involvement with the introduction of monotheism, the liberation and the nationalization of his people, and the legislative literature which he introduces to his people. Markedly, it’s in those three features that our current “secular” society perceives itself unconsciously. It’s in this context that Moses appears to be a truly influential mythical figure.

Nationalism and the Utilization of Religion

The three readings, which include Schwartz’s “Curse of Cain, Herzl’s “The Jewish State”, and Christian Karner’s article, tackle the issue of religiously related nationalism from various perspectives. By introducing the concept of a primordial nation or people, both Schwartz and Karner attempt to narrow the concept of nationalism and rather view it as an ideological view of history. In particular, Hindutva is the term that Karner uses in reference to Hindu-nationalism. Moreover, Hindu nationalism promotes the unity of the Indian subcontinent under the flag of Hinduism. By maintaining that India from its very origins is defined by the Hindu-religion, Hindu nationalists attempt to create an ancient historical back ground to their claims. In such cases, nationalism establishes its principles on a very particular and ideologically generated understanding of history.

Further, one tool in which an ideological foundation always proves to be influential is religion. Since the 19^th century, nationalist movements have often times demonstrated such use of religion. Despite the fact that their incentive is usually a material need, such as land or resources, religion can inspire a great part of their ideology. In other words, even though nationalist movements begin secularly, as to satisfy a material need, primordial movements turn to religion because it seems to be more appealing, profound and influential. Superficially, Indian, Jewish and Arab nationalism illustrate the increasing interest of nationalist movements in employing a religious tone into their propaganda. First, by the end of the 19^th century and the beginnings of the 20^th Indians, Jews, and Arabs faced the challenge of developing a common identity in which they can define themselves with against another ethnic group. For the Arabs and Indians such questions didn’t come to existence until the decline of the colonial powers that controlled their regions. For the Arabs, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a political vacuum. Although later ruled by foreign powers, namely France and Britain, it was under such political disruption that Arab nationalism came to existence. Similarly, Indian nationalist agenda came to rise under the severity of British colonialism. In fact, Indian nationalism evolved over a period of more than 50 years, during which the Indian sub continent was trying fiercely to resist British occupation. Likewise, a similar analysis can be traced upon Jewish nationalist movements.

Moreover, all of those three ethnicities faced a common question which they struggled to address. Namely, “Who is a Hindu”, “What does it mean to be an Arab”, “what makes me Jewish”. Such questions were proposed because of the inherent nature of nationalism calls for addressing them. In other words, Defining Indian-ness and setting exclusive boundaries to such a concept wouldn’t merely narrow the model but it would deepen its influence over the masses. On the other hand, such questions are, as in the case with the Jews and Arabs, are imposed rather than been sought after. Specifically, as Herzl’s mentions in his article, the common characteristics among the Jewish people, who were in Diaspora at that time, were rather imposed on them than being chosen to be shared. He says that “We are one people; our enemies have made us one without our consent.” Such analysis can also be traced back to the creation of Arab, and particularly, Palestinian identity. In particular, the Palestinian people didn’t recognize themselves as one people until the collective memory, which all Palestinians now share, of the “Nakba,” the Palestinian exodus took place.

Furthermore, in the cases of Indians, Jews, and Arabs, it’s this concept of a glorious past that had been shredded away by foreign imperialist ambitions that founds the identity of each people respectively. The Exodus, both in the Jewish and Palestinian literature functions an emotionally strong symbol of unity under oppression. Because of the lingering struggle that a people have to undergo to liberate themselves from oppression, nationalist movements realize that a more profound ideology is needed to function as a stronger incentive for the masses. After realizing the ineffectiveness of their secular ideology, they become more prone to use religion as part of their vision. In this context, religious literature provides a movement with a stronger authority over the people. In other words, religiously-motivated nationalist propaganda deeply attracts believers and appeals to their own religious commitments. Often times they seek religion as the last tool in which they can attain liberty and justice. For example, it wasn’t until the complete failure of secular pan-Arabism movements that Islamism overtook such popularity in the Arab World. Moreover, as with most nationalist propaganda, religious nationalism generates an ideologically driven historical narrative that includes an ideal model of the past coupled with strong loss and disintegration.